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INTRODUCTION

According to legends dating back to the Renaissance, the ermine
would rather die than soil its pristine white coat. The ermine so
came to symbolize purity, and English judges adopted this symbol by
adorning their robes with ermine fur.2 For their part, American
judges took a more ermine-friendly approach, dispensing with the fur
but retaining the ermine as a symbol. Wearing the 'judicial ermine"
thus reflected a commitment to "purity and justice," 3 and "the abandonment of all party bias and personal prejudice. '4 The Tennessee
Supreme Court captured the essence of the myth nicely in 1872, when
it wrote:
We are told that the little creature called the ermine is so acutely
sensitive as to its own cleanliness, that it becomes paralyzed and
powerless at the slightest touch of defilement upon its snow-white
fur.... And a like sensibility should belong to him who comes to
exercise the august functions of a judge .... But when once this
great office becomes corrupted, when its judgments come to reflect
the passions or the interest of the magistrate rather than the mandates of the law, the courts have ceased to be the conservators of the
common weal, and the law itself is debauched into a prostrate and
5
nerveless mockery.
Although reference to the judicial ermine has fallen from common usage, the assumption it embodies-that when they don their
robes, independent judges set aside their passions, prejudices, and interests and follow the law-remains integral to the legal establish-

I Christopher Gregg, The Ermine, MINERVA

BRITANNA PROJECT,

http://fl.middle-

bury.edu/FS010A/STUDENTS/n075.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
2 1 THE WORLD BOOK DICTbONARv 720 (2003).
3 In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam) ("The attitude of the
judge and the atmosphere of the court room should indeed be such that no matter what
charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause he is called on to litigate, he can approach
the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum where the judicial ermine is everything
that it typifies, purity and justice.").
4 Claire Martin, Biography ofJudge John K. Alexander, CAL. GENWEB PROJECT, http://
www.cagenweb.com/monterey/bios/alexanderjk.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) ("To assume the judicial ermine and wear it worthily requires the abandonment of all party bias
and personal prejudice, a possession of educational qualifications, clean hands, and a pure
heart.").
5 Harrison v. Wisdom, 54 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 99, 112 (1872).
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ment's traditional conception of the role that the judiciary plays in
American government. 6 That assumption has come under sustained
attack by scholars and policymakers, 7 leading to the question of
whether there is enough truth to this "ermine myth" to make it one
still worth defending, or whether the time has come to demythologize
our understanding of what judges do and to acknowledge that, truth
be told, the ermine is just a glorified weasel. Put another way, can the
rule of law survive judicial politics?
In the academic realm, law professors long operated on the assumption that judges decide cases by bracketing out extraneous influences and following the relevant facts and law. 8 Doctrinal scholarship,
which all but monopolized the pages of law reviews for generations,
proceeds from the premise that legal doctrine matters above all else
when it comes to understanding why judges do what they do-that the
decisions judges make must be understood and critiqued with reference to applicable law.9 Meanwhile, many political scientists long posited that judges decide cases by following their ideological
predilections.10 In light of findings generated by studies of Supreme
Court decision making, these scholars relegated the so-called legal
model to the status of a total fabrication.1 1 More recently, however, a
cadre of interdisciplinary scholars has bridged this divide with a flurry
of empirical projects demonstrating that judicial decision making is
subject to a complex array of influences, including law, ideology, and
others. 12
6

See sources cited supra notes 3-5.

7 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Keynote Address, Judicial Takings, JudicialSpeech, and
DoctrinalAcceptance of the Model of the Judge as PoliticalActor, 6 DuKEJ. CONST. L. & Pus. POL'Y
1, 1-3 (2011) (discussing judges' policy preferences); Ruth Marcus, Booting the Bench:
There's New Ferocity in Talk of FiringActivistJudges, WASH. PosT, Apr. 11, 2005, at A19 (quoting Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum, who characterized judges as ignoring the law and
instead following their own policy preferences).
8 See Thomas R. Hensley & Scott P. Johnson, Unanimity on the Rehnquist Court, 31
AKRON L. REv. 387, 389 (1998) (discussing how scholars traditionally assumed that legal
factors sufficiently explained unanimity); Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1733 (2003) (reviewing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002))

("Law professors believe

the Constitution and other laws constrain the Court, while most political scientists do
not.").
9
See Hensley & Johnson, supra note 8.
10 See Gerhardt, supra note 8; Marshall, supra note 7, at 8-9 (discussing the judicial
political realist belief that judges follow their ideological preferences).
11
See Marshall, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing two Supreme Court cases tending to
prove that judges are political actors); Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court ForecastingProject: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1157-58
(2004) (discussing the attitudinal model of Supreme Court behavior).
12 See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic
Debates About StatisticalMeasures, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 743, 779-83 (2005).
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This slowly emerging interdisciplinary consensus among scholars
has no analog in the policymaking realm. Court critics and defenders
have squared off in shrill, dichotomous debates.' 3 Critics assert that
judges whose decisions they excoriate are "activists" who disregard the
law, live to satiate their ideological appetites, and must be held accountable and controlled. 14 Defenders characterize judges as the heroic progeny of Solomon whose sole devotion is to the rule of law and
whose independence from the rabble must be preserved. 15 In this Article, I explore the implications of the emerging interdisciplinary consensus on whatjudges do for the ongoing public policy debate on how
the judiciary should be regulated. To date, it is a largely unstudied
issue. Scholars devoted to the empirical study of judicial decision
making have focused on developing positive theories of judicial decision-making behavior with only passing regard to the policy implications of such theories, 16 while scholars who have written about judicial
independence and accountability as a matter of public policy have developed normative theories largely divorced from the empirical
17
data.
Part I of this Article describes the progress of the scholarly debate
over what judges do, from the legal realism movement to the present
day. I do so in some detail, for two reasons. First, the story of this
emerging integrated, eclectic, multidisciplinary understanding ofjudicial decision making is recent enough that to date it has been told
only in piecemeal fashion.1 8 Second, empiricists leading this multidisciplinary movement may be familiar with the story, but many others in
the academic and legal realms are not. In discussing recent developments in this debate, the objective is to focus on the emerging common ground rather than on the differences that remain. In so doing,
my ultimate point is a simple one: dichotomous arguments to the effect that judges categorically disregard the law and follow their policy
preferences (or something else), or categorically disregard their pol13
Compare Marcus, supra note 7 (detailing criticism on judges' perceived use of personal preferences in rendering judicial decisions), with Terri Jennings Peretti, DoesJudicial
Independence Exist? The Lessons of Social Science Research, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 103, 120 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (surveying scholars' claims that judicial independence is important).
14
See Marcus, supra note 7; Ken Connor, Activist Judges Undermine Government by the
People, CENTER JUST SOC'Y (May 22, 2008), http://www.centerforajustsociety.org//2008/
05/22/13445/ideas-in-action/activistjudges-undermine-government-by-the-people/.
15 See, e.g., Peretti, supra note 13.
16
See infra Part I.D.

See infra Part II.
Judge Richard Posner explodes the ongoing, multidisciplinary study ofjudicial decision making into nine competing schools of thought, but my goal here is the reverse: to
synthesize hitherto "competing" theories in a manner consistent with the more collaborative ethos of recent work. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 19-56 (2008).
17
18
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icy preferences (and everything else) to follow the law, have been
debunked.
In stark contrast to this emerging interdisciplinary, scholarly consensus on a more eclectic, positive theory of judicial decision making
is the public policy debate over judicial independence, accountability,
and selection, where the underlying assumptions about what judges
do remain stubbornly binary. The legal establishment maintains that
judges who are buffered from political pressure will abide by their
oaths of office and follow the law-hence the need for an independent judiciary that is insulated from popular and political control.1 9
Court critics posit that when left to their own devices,judges disregard
the law and decide cases in a manner consistent with their policy preferences, strategic objectives, or personal feelings-hence the need for
an accountable judiciary that is subject to popular and political control. 20 Part II will review the public policy arguments of court defenders and critics, to the end of contrasting how simplistically
dichotomous they are, relative to the more nuanced findings of recent
empirical scholarship.
In Part III, I seek to explain why, when it comes to describing the
influences on judicial decision making, the public policy debate has
remained stubbornly dichotomous while the scholarly debate has
moved toward eclecticism and greater consensus. By their nature,
public policy debates are aimed at capturing the hearts and minds of
the general public. Survey data reveal that the public thinks judges
are influenced by legal and extralegal factors-meaning that the public's impressions of what influences judicial decision making is consistent with the findings of recent research detailed in Part I. Surveys
further show that the public retains considerable confidence in its
judges. Taken together, these results imply that it may be foolish and
unnecessary for the legal establishment to cultivate the pretense that
judges are influenced by facts and law alone. Those same surveys,
however, show that the ermine myth continues to hold sway, as sizable
majorities believe that judges should be influenced only by the facts
and law and disapprove of the extralegal influences that they think
occur. For the legal establishment to openly concede the inevitability
of extralegal influence would be to undermine the myth and with it
potentially the public's confidence in the courts.
In Part IV, I move from the descriptive to the predictive. One
possibility is that the dichotomous public policy debate detailed in
19

See AM.

BAR ASS'N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE

21sT

70 (2003) (suggesting that "the administration of justice should not
turn on the outcome of popularity contests" and proposing a preferred system of judicial
appointment that reduces money's corrosive effect on judicial selection).
20
See Marcus, supra note 7; Connor, supra note 14.
CENTURY JUDICIARY
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Part III will persist into the foreseeable future without further consequence: judges will continue to say that they are slaves to the rule of
law; critics will attack "activist" judges as symptomatic of a judiciary
run amok; and the public will look askance at judges who deviate, but
will retain its faith in the ermine myth. Without disputing the impressive force of inertia, I argue that a series of developments years in the
making renders this outcome unlikely. The latest campaign against
"liberal judicial activism," media coverage of an ideologically divided
Supreme Court, partisan battles over nominee ideology in Senate judicial-confirmation proceedings, publicized accounts of judges declining to disqualify themselves from cases in which the risk of extralegal
influence seems obvious, and the advent of expensive, highly
politicized state court election campaigns cast doubt on assumptions
that we are in a business-as-usual scenario, in which the public's continued faith in its judges and the rule of law is a foregone conclusion.
A second possibility is that the events just described have put us on a
path to crisis, but polling data showing continued public confidence
in the courts belie the imminence of such a development. A third
possibility-and the most likely-is that we will witness a gradual erosion of rule-of-law values as the public internalizes the lessons of recent developments and becomes increasingly jaded about judges and
their need for independence.
In Part V, I turn from the predictive to the prescriptive. The key
for the legal establishment, I argue, is to reorient the ermine myth
itself. For myths to galvanize a community, there must be a perceived
truth at their core. Although there is truth to the "myth" that independent judges follow the law, that kernel of truth is diminished because "law," for purposes of the myth, has been characterized so
rigidly, in terms more compatible with nineteenth-century formalism
than more flexible, contemporary understandings. If the primary justification for an independent judiciary is to bracket out extralegal influences and enable judges to apply the law as a kind of formula, then
deepening skepticism over the rule of law and the value of judicial
independence is inevitable.
It is possible, however, to step back and reaffirm the instrumental
value of an independent judiciary in other terms, which underscore
the role judicial independence plays in promoting three discrete
objectives: a more capacious rule of law (one that acknowledges the
inevitability ofjudicial discretion and the role that different influences
play in informing that discretion), due process, and just outcomes informed by a ubiquitous form of pragmatism that most judges employ.
The claim that judicial independence promotes a more flexible rule
of law, due or fair process, and just outcomes is still "mythological"
insofar as excessive independence can liberate judges to act upon
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other interests that interfere with these goals. That, however, is where
mechanisms for judicial accountability must operate to backstop independence by pursuing the very same objectives.
Reorienting the ermine myth to say that independent judges uphold a flexible rule of law, preserve due process, and seek just outcomes will force the legal establishment to rethink its reform agenda.
For generations, the mantra of reformers within the legal establishment has been to "depoliticize" or "take the politics out" of the judiciary. That view may be compatible with crumbling formalism but is illsuited to coexist with a new construct positing that judges are properly
subject to a range of extralegal influences, including "political" ones,
insofar as such influences concern the art of governing fairly and sensibly. The better approach, I contend, is to move toward an era of
"managed politics," in which the goal is to regulate, rather than exterminate, extralegal influences on judicial decision making to the end
of promoting the three objectives of judicial independence and accountability. In many ways, that era is already upon us, but acknowledging it more explicitly should better inform the legal
establishment's reform agenda. I conclude by illustrating the point
with a brief discussion of possible reforms in the arenas of legal education, judicial selection, and judicial oversight. In the end, the rule of
law can survive judicial politics, not by disavowing the existence of extralegal influences, but by managing them.
I
THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE ON WHAT JUDGES

Do:

INCHING

TOwARD CONSENSUS
Recent developments have reconciled, to an extent greater than

ever before, the competing views of scholars across academic disciplines of what influences judicial decision making. To appreciate the
significance of those developments, however, it is necessary to embed
them in a historical context. A logical starting point is the advent of
formalism in the nineteenth century, which gradually gave way to conflicting and, more recently, unifying approaches to understanding judicial decision making.
A. The Ascendance of Formalism
In the United States, the first half of the nineteenth century was a
time of geographical and economic expansion. To accommodate that
expansion, merchants and entrepreneurs were keen to modernize the
common law by "forg [ing] an alliance with the legal profession to ad-

vance their own interests through a transformation of the legal sys-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:191

tem."2 1 To facilitate this transformation to a more business-friendly
common law, courts often resolved close cases with reference to pub22
lic policy and conceptions of economic justice.
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, this transformation was
close to complete. 23 To shore up the gains of the previous half-century, the simple solution was to lock those gains in place with a new,
more formalistic way of looking at the law, which "gave common law
rules the appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexorable, and which, by making 'legal reasoning seem like mathematics,'
conveyed 'an air ...

24
of ... inevitability' about legal decisions."

In the latter third of the nineteenth century, when populists and
progressives challenged economic elites and the legal order they had
cultivated, mainstream judges of the era found refuge in the new formalism. "For these judges," Lawrence Friedman writes, "formalism
was a protective device. They were middle-of-the-road conservatives,
holding off the vulgar rich on one hand, the revolutionary masses on
the other. The legal tradition represented balance, sound values, a
25
commitment to orderly process."
Meanwhile, Harvard Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell revolutionized legal education in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by reorienting the focus of the law school classroom away from
lectures on legal principles toward questions and answers that divined
legal principles from cases. 2 6 Implicit in the case method was the notion that legal principles could be deduced from scientific analysis of
cases and legal scholarship should be devoted to isolating and classifying those principles in exhaustive articles and treatises. 27 The net effect was to inculcate new generations of lawyers with the values of
28
formalism or, more neutrally, "classical legal thought."
21 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 251, 251
(1975).
22 William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed, Introduction, in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xi, xii (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
23
Horwitz, supra note 21, at 251.

24 Id. at 252 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 7 (1894).
25
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 288 (3d ed. 2005).
26

JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

25-26 (1995).
27 Id. at 27 (quoting James Barr Ames's recommendation that law professors should
create "a high order of treatises on all the important branches of the law, exhibiting the
historical development of the subject and containing sound conclusions based on scientific
analysis"); see also, Fisher et al., supra note 22 (noting that "[p]roperly organized, law was
like geometry" to classical educators); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. P-r.L.
REv. 1, 5 (1983) ("Langdell believed that through scientific methods lawyers could derive
correct legal judgments from a few fundamental principles and concepts ..
28 Grey, supra note 27, at 16.
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The Rise and Fall of Legal Realism

During the progressive era, the dictates of classical legal thought
were challenged from various quarters. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes opined that:
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic.
And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance
of competing legislative grounds ....We do not realize how large a
part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in
29
the habit of the public mind.
Dean Roscoe Pound, in turn, complained about the prevailing
"mechanical jurisprudence," in which "premises are no longer to be
examined," and "[e]verything is reduced to simple deduction from
them" to the point where "social progress" is "barred by barricades of
30
dead precedents."
In the 1920s, academic lawyers at Columbia and Yale, persuaded
by the critiques of Holmes, Pound, and others, renounced formalism,
proposed a more "functional" curriculum that deemphasized technical legal doctrine, and argued that law was better studied empirically
as a social science-a series of activities that Columbia law professor
Karl Llewellyn collectively denominated "realism."3 1 The realist critique of formalism could be scathing, as illustrated by the following
excerpt from Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind:
Myth-making and fatherly lies must be abandoned-the Santa Claus
story of complete legal certainty; the fairy tale of a pot of golden law
which is already in existence and which the good lawyer can find, if
only he is sufficiently diligent; the phantasy of an aesthetically satisfactory system and harmony, consistent and uniform, which will
32
spring up when we find the magic wand of rationalizing principle.
For this new realist, then, law was not transcendental; rather, law
was what law did. To understand how judges decided cases, the realist
deemphasized parsing the abstract legal principles upon which judges
purported to rely and devoted more time to studying what judges really did-balance the competing policies at stake in the cases that
33
came before them.

31

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 465-66 (1897).
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 462 (1909).
See generally, SCHLEGEL, supra note 26, at 15-18.

32

JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

29
30

260 (Anchor Books ed. 1963) (1930).

N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921), reprinted in
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 22, at 172, 176-77 (describing the judicial process as
one involving balancing interests); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 842 (1935) ("[The judge] will frankly assess the
33

BENJAMIN
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Legal realism's campaign to reorient the study of law away from a
body of rules and toward empirical, social science analysis of judicial
behavior never gained traction in American law schools and by the
end of the 1930s had run its course. 34 John Henry Schlegel explains
why realism was menacing to the legal academy, in terms that apply
equally to judges:
Science was too threatening. It suggested that the words of law
might not be too important, that the special preserve of the law
professor might not be too special and that, since law was not just
rules, the rule of law might not be just a matter of following rules
either. That threat was simply too much for the professional identity of the law professor; it could only be attacked mercilessly or dis35
tanced with derisive laughter.

I have told the traditional story of formalism and its confrontation with realism in stark terms to highlight the origins of differences
in approach to judicial decision making that persist to this day. The
traditional story, however, arguably exaggerates the extent of the "formalist-realist divide. '36 In a close study of the period, Brian
Tamanaha found that "many of the most prominent lawyers, judges
and academics of the day.. . described judging in consummately realistic terms," 37 while many legal realists "believed in the law," 38 sought
to "increase the certainty and predictability of law," 39 and "did not
assert that judges routinely manipulate the law to produce desired
outcomes. '40 Tamanaha's insights add symmetry to the thrust of this
Article: While I argue that the time has come to end unjustifiably dichotomous public policy debates over what judges do, Tamanaha
shows that the historical origins of those debates have themselves
been portrayed in terms that are unjustifiably dichotomous.
The Rebirth of Realism and the Rise of the "Attitudinal
Model"

C.

The demise of the legal realism movement signaled an end to
widespread agitation within the legal academy for teaching, writing,
conflicting human values that are opposed in every controversy, appraise the social importance of the precedents to which each claim appeals .... ").
34
Charles K. Rowley, An Intellectual History of Law and Economics: 1739-2003, in THE
ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 3, 11 (Francesco Parisi
& Charles K Rowley eds., 2005) ("By the late 1930s, [legal realism] had faded from the

scene.").
supra note 26, at 255.
Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS
IN JUDGING 3 (2010) (" [T]he formalist-realist divide is wrong in essential respects.").
37
Id. at 4.
38
Id. at 94.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 6-7, 94.
35

SCHLEGEL,

36

BRIAN
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and thinking about law as a social science rather than a system of
rules. Legal realism did, however, influence some academic lawyers to
explore the ways in which related disciplines illuminated the analysis
of law-disciplines that gradually worked their way into law schools as
"law and . . ." subfields. 4 1 Thus, legal realism is credited with catalyzing the law and economics movement, partly because legal realism
paved the way by challenging formalism's monopoly on legal analysis
and partly because realism was vulnerable to the critique that it lacked
a well-defined methodology, which economic analysis sought to supply. 42 Law and psychology is more clearly rooted in the realist tradition and came into its own in the early 1950s, when the University of
Chicago Law School initiated a Law and Behavioral Science Program
that undertook pathbreaking research into the psychology of jury behavior. 43 And devotees of law and sociology-a subfield that made its
first real splash in the 1960s with law school projects at the University
of California at Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin 44-ikewise
trace their empirical tradition and interest in the interrelationship be45
tween law and society back to the realists.
In law schools, consigning a discipline to "law and" status can operate as a means of marginalization that keeps it at a distance from the
study of "real" law, which has remained focused on the rules that
judges interpret and apply. 46 Such was not the fate of political sci41
Rowley, supra note 34, at 11 ("The real significance of legal realism is to be found
.. .in the avenue that it opened up for a future marriage between law and certain social
sciences....").
42
Id. at 12 ("The path towards law and economics undoubtedly was smoothed by the
legal realist challenge to formalism that opened up American legal education to the study
of the social sciences."); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2
(1986) ("Law and economics [is] a continuation of the social scientific tradition in the law
that began with Roscoe Pound and the realists."); Edmund W. Kitch, The IntellectualFoundations of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 184 (1983) ("[W]hen the serious
scholar of the law wishes to turn from the preliminaries and get on with intensive investigation of law and legal institutions, he can find tools and insights in the law-and-economics
tradition that advance his work."). This is not to suggest, however, that law and economics
scholars share intellectual roots with legal realism in the same way that political scientists
and psychologists do. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 3 (1995) ("The law
and economics movement owes little to legal realism.").
43
See generally SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON

TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

12-14 (1988) (describing the University of Chicago

Jury Project).
44

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

7 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the collaboration between legal scholars and social scientists
more formally structured in the mid-1960s at U.C. Berkeley, the University of Wisconsin,
and other schools); SCHLEGEL, supra note 26 at 248-50 (describing the successful Russell
Sage programs at U.C., Berkley and the University of Wisconsin).
45
FRIEDMAN & MACAULAY, supra note 44, at 2 (tracing the law and behavioral science
movement to legal realism in the 1920s and 1930s).
46
SCHLEGEL, supra note 26, at 254 (discussing "the second-class citizenship that was
implied by 'law and'"). Law and economics has fared somewhat better, in part because its
approach is more compatible with a rules-based analysis. Rowley, supra note 34, at 12
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ence, however, where interest in law as a social science was sufficient
to ensconce the study of judicial behavior within a political science
subfield (courts and constitutional law, or public law), wholly independent of legal education. 4 7 While many academic lawyers were uncomfortable with the implications of legal realism, political scientists
of the realist era were not. So-called "old-institutionalist" political
scientists of the day, such as Edward Corwin, Robert Cushman, and
Charles Grove Haines, were realists of a moderate stripe who "believed that politics entered the judicial process in subtle and complex
ways. ''48 In other words, they did not think that "policy preferences or

individual 'interests' determined how judges decided cases," even
though "they recognized such preferences could affect judicial decisions. '49 In the 1940s, however, C. Herman Pritchett introduced a
more aggressive "behavioral" strain of legal realism to the study of
courts, grounded in a social psychology paradigm. 50 Pritchett and his
successors set out to demonstrate, through empirical research, that
judges were "motivated by their own preferences."5 1 Exhibit A in
Pritchett's analysis was the tendency of majority and dissenting Supreme Court opinions to reach divergent conclusions from the same
facts and law-a divergence that he explained with reference to the
52
policy preferences of the individual Justices.
Unencumbered by the norms of a legal culture that proceeded
from the premise that law operates as a constraint on judicial behavior, political scientists who followed in Pritchett's footsteps devoted
themselves to describing what judges do in terms that marginalized
law as a variable in the judicial decision-making equation. 53 In the
("[T]he relationship [between legal realism and law and economics] should not be exaggerated," in part because law and economics "turned out to be a movement that incorporated some of the formalism of the Langdellian era, albeit a formalism which was based on
the notion that laws should be economically efficient, rather than that they should rest on
stare decisis and precedent.").
47

FRIEDMAN & MACAULAY, supra note 44, at 7 ("[llt is fair to note that a social science

interest in law is outside the mainstream of scholarship in law, and in all social sciences,
except perhaps political science.").
48 Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and PoliticalJurisprudence:New and Old Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEw INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 15, 20

(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
49
50

Id.

51

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND

Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew Martin, The Political(Science) Context ofJudging,
47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783, 786 (2003) (discussing Pritchett's role in moving legal realism
into the political science department and adopting quantitative empirical methods); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 384 (2007) (discussing the extent
to which a social psychological paradigm dominates the study of court decision making by
political scientists).
VALUES 1937-1947, at xii-xiii (1948).
52

See id.

53

See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 263 (2006).
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1960s, Glendon Schubert coined the term "attitudinal" to describe a
model that explained how Supreme Court Justices voted with reference to their attitudes or ideological preferences. 54 And in the 1990s,
Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal summarized the current state of political science research on Supreme Court decision making in an influential book that pitted the "attitudinal model" against the "legal
model;" they declared the former victorious, characterizing the legal
model as "meaningless." 55 Against this backdrop of what many political scientists regarded as overwhelming evidence in support of the attitudinal model, the persistent view perpetuated by lawyers, judges,
and law schools that the Supreme Court decides cases in light of appli56
cable law was relegated to the status of myth.
In light of data generated by proponents of the attitudinal model,
by the 1990s few political scientists would dispute that votes on the
U.S. Supreme Court were influenced by the policy preferences of the
individual Justices. 57 But in the minds of some, "studying the Supreme Court ... as little more than a collection of individuals who

were pursuing their personal policy preferences" failed to take adequate account of other influences on judicial behavior. 58 In two im-

portant books, Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton collected and
promoted the recent work of "neoinstitutional" scholars (a label they
applied to link these scholars in spirit to "old institutionalists" of the
realist age), who argued that that judicial decision making is more

54

GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SU-

PREME COURTJUSTICES 1946-1963, at 22 (1965).
55
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AT"ITUDINAL

MODEL 17, 62-65 (1993).
56 Id.; John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of
the Supreme Court, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 928, 937 (2000) ("[O]nly a minority of citizens subscribe
to the myth of legality in terms of what they perceive to actually determine Court decisions.... In particular, there is widespread recognition of the effect of the justices' ideologies on their decisions.")
57 Peretti, supra note 13, at 109-10 (2002) ("This 'attitudinal model' is widely accepted by social scientists who study the courts. As Professor Segal asserts, '[n]o serious
scholar of the judiciary denies that the decisions ofjudges, especially at the Supreme Court
level, are at least partially influenced by the judges' ideology."' (quoting Jeffrey A. Segal,
Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist Model, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra note 48, at 237, 237)).
58 Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional Approachesto Supreme CourtDecision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra note 48, at 1, 1-3 (" [T] here are good reasons to think that
there may be much to be gained by focusing less on the policy preferences of particular
justices and more on the distinctive characteristics of the Court as an institution, its relationship to other institutions in the political system, and how both of these might shape
judicial values and attitudes.").
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fully understood against the backdrop of the political, legal, social,
59
and cultural institutions of which judges are a part.
Thus, for example, neoinstitutionalists such as Lee Epstein and
Jack Knight, who advanced a quasi-economic "rational-choice" theory
ofjudicial decision making, argued that while judges are indeed "seekers of legal policy," as attitudinal scholars posit, their "ability to
achieve their goals [primarily policy goals] depends on a consideration of the preferences of others. ' 60 In other words, from a rationalchoice perspective, judges do not vote reflexively in accord with their
personal policy preferences, but think strategically about how Congress, the President, and others may react to given case outcomes and
adjust their decision making accordingly to better effectuate preferred policy outcomes.
In contrast, other neoinstitutional scholars advocated a "historical interpretive" approach to understanding judicial decision making,
which argues that historical accounts of institutional development are
critical to understanding the values of decision makers within those
institutions. 61 Thus, thejudiciary's institutional setting helps to create
and frame the values that judges seek to implement when they make
decisions-values that can include, among others, a commitment to
the rule of law. For their part, ardent proponents of the attitudinal
model often responded less by trying to accommodate the neoinstitutional critique than by conducting new studies that set out to prove
62
the neoinstitutionalists wrong.
Meanwhile, back at the law schools, the lessons of legal realism
enjoyed a brief renaissance in the 1970s with the critical legal studies
movement, which posited that elite judges perpetuate the domination
of their class by exploiting the fiction of the law's rationality and evenhandedness-thereby entrenching preexisting inequalities. 63 By the
1980s, however, the critical legal studies movement had collapsed
59

SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra note

48; THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
(Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999).

NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS

at xiii (1998).
Gillman & Clayton, supra note 58, at 6 (describing one neoinstitutional camp as
comprised of those whose work "seeks to provide historical accounts of institutional development or interpretive characterizations of the actions ofjudges," and noting that "historical institutional studies tend to assume that judicial behavior is not merely structured by
institutions but is also constituted by them in the sense that goals and values associated with
particular political arrangements give energy and direction to political actors"); see also
Clayton, supra note 48, at 31 (attributing the "historical-interpretive variant" of new institutionalism to Rogers Smith and others).
62
Friedman, supra note 53, at 263 ("Today, attitudinalists devote too much effort to
...
fending off claims that something other than attitudes matter.").
63
See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
InterdisciplinayIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 259 (1997) ("However, most advocates of
CLS go further and claim that the indeterminacy is manipulated in the interests of capital60
61

LEE EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE,
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under the weight of its inability to verify its intuitions through empirical research and its failure to propose a more satisfactory alternative
64
to the status quo it berated.
As the attitudinal model came into its own in the latter half of the
twentieth century, one might suppose that the deluge of data attitudinal studies generated, purportedly demonstrating the irrelevance of
law to judicial decision making, would be of acute interest and concern to law professors, judges, and lawyers. But as the twentieth century drew to a close, the sweeping conclusions of attitudinal studies
that were causing a cacophonous din in political science circles were
being greeted in the legal profession by the sound of crickets.
Professor Frank Cross, writing in 1997, was among the first to decry this "unfortunate interdisciplinary ignorance" in a law review article. 65 "The political science research and the attitudinal model are
significant in that they could potentially obliterate the foundations of
much current and past legal scholarship," Cross noted, but "[t] o date,
legal scholarship has been remarkably oblivious to this large and
mounting body of political science scholarship on courts." 66 Professor
Michael Gerhardt attributed the obliviousness to a fundamental difference in world view: "Law professors believe the Constitution and
other laws constrain the Court, while most political scientists do not.
These different perspectives on justices' fidelity to the law ensure that
legal scholars and political scientists have little to say about the Court
67
that is of interest to each other."
Judge Patricia Wald went further, suggesting that the legal community was not oblivious, but dismissive: "I register something of a hohum reaction to the notion that judges' personal philosophies enter
into their decisionmaking when statute or precedent does not point
their discretion in one direction or constrain it in another."68 In
other words, to the extent that the attitudinal model stood for the
softer proposition that judges are influenced by their policy preferences, the model told the legal profession nothing it did not know
already; 69 and to the extent that it stood for the harder proposition
that law does not operate as a constraint on judges, the attitudinal
model reflected a difference in perspective so fundamental as to fore70
close a productive exchange of ideas.
ist elites. Precedent has been a 'mask' for rules of oppression perpetuated by concentrations of power, especially that of capital.").
64 Id. at 257-58, 260 n.41.
65
66

Id.
Id. at 252-53.

67
68

Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 1733.
Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 235, 236 (1999).

69

Id.

70

See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.

206
D.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 97:191

The New Empiricists

Law professors and political scientists had thus developed contradictory, dichotomous conceptions of judicial decision making that
they happily cultivated in relative isolation. Persistent calls for more
serious interdisciplinary engagement, however, gradually intruded
upon their solitude. 71 Some law professors and judges argued that
political scientists were not taking law seriously enough.7 2 Others critiqued attitudinal studies, arguing that such studies delineated the
scope of "law" so narrowly and rigidly as to render its irrelevance to
judicial decision making a fait accompli. 73 Still other legal scholars
embarked on empirical research agendas of their own, eliciting criticism, if not potshots from some political scientists as to their methodology, but simultaneously giving rise to a renaissance of interest
74
among academic lawyers in the empirical study of judicial behavior.
This "'Quantitative Moment' in the legal academy" 75 has, in a very
short time, all but obliterated the study of judicial decision making as
an either-or enterprise, in which one must choose sides and explain
judicial behavior with reference to law or policy preferences as if they
76
were mutually exclusive alternatives.
1. Studies in Law and Politics: The Supreme Court
By the time the quantitative moment arrived, political scientists
had already established an all-but-irrefutable empirical case for the
71 Epstein et al., supra note 50, at 783 ("It has been in only the last few years that law
professors have shown much interest in political science approaches to judging . ... ");
Friedman, supra note 53, at 262 ("[L]egal scholars now are pursuing the same sort of empirical inquiries as positive scholars, creating exciting opportunities for true interdisciplinary collaboration.").
72 Friedman, supra note 53, at 262 ("Yet, reflecting an almost pathological skepticism
that law matters, positive scholars of courts and judicial behavior simply fail to take law and
legal institutions seriously."); see also Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the
D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1335 (1998) (denouncing two studies as "the heedless
observations of academic scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand the work of...
judges").
73
Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, ReconsideringJudicialIndependence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 13, at
9, 25 (discussing the problems attitudinal studies have had by "operationalizing" law);
Cross, supra note 63, at 264 ("This particular criticism may seem unpersuasive to lawyers as
excessively reductionist-the ability to make colorable arguments for two different sides
does not mean that those arguments are necessarily of equal validity.").
74 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 11 (2002)
(criticizing legal scholars for giving insufficient attention to methodology in empirical
analysis); see also Sisk & Heise, supra note 12, at 779-83 (discussing the "Great Empirical
Method Debate of 2002" provoked by the Epstein and King article).
75 Gregory C. Sisk, The QuantitativeMoment and the Qualitative Opportunity:Legal Studies
ofJudicialDecision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 873, 876 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS,
DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)).
76 Id. at 877 (discussing the indispensability of both empirical studies and doctrinal
studies).
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proposition that a Justice's policy preferences influence his or her
votes on the U.S. Supreme Court. Segal and Spaeth reported that
they could predict 74% of individual Justices' decisions on the basis of
their attitudinal predispositions; 77 another study by Segal and Albert
Cover found that in civil liberties cases, the correlation between the
attitudes of individual Justices and their voting behavior was 80% or
78
higher.
Subsequent interdisciplinary work has, however, yielded important nuances. In 2003, two law professors and two political scientists
published the results of a "Supreme Court Forecasting Project" in
which man squared off against machine in what can best be described
as a twenty-first-century remake of the "Ballad of John Henry. 79 Overall, the "machine"-a statistical model-outperformed the predictions of legal experts by correctly forecasting case outcomes 75% of
the time, as compared to 59.1% for the experts.8 0
While this project would seem to have pitted political scientists
against lawyers in a kind of celebrity death match, in reality, it went a
long way toward demonstrating that the longstanding law-versus-attitude debate presented a false dichotomy. For the machine to work,
the computer model could not base its predictions on naive "attitudinal assumptions," which the authors found "insufficient to generate
specific forecasts prospectively."' 8 1 Rather, to maximize its predictive
capabilities, the model employed classification trees that forecast a
Justice's future decisions in light of how that Justice had previously
decided cases that were similar in six semispecific respects. 8 2 At the
same time, to maximize their predictive capabilities, the experts were
not confined to naive doctrinal analysis of pending cases, but were
free to take attitudinal factors into account when making their
83
predictions.
Insofar as "legal experts" appreciate that a Justice's policy preferences influence how he or she analyzes the law in close cases, they
cannot be surprised to learn that sophisticated statistical models
aimed at isolating the Justices' policy predilections can often predict
Supreme Court decisions-particularly since the experts likely tried to
77

78

SEGAL &

SPAETH,

supra note 55, at 229.

Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
CourtJustices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 557, 561-62 (1989).
79
Ruger et al., supra note 11, at 1151.
80
Id. at 1152.
81
Id. at 1164.
82
Id. at 1163. The six factors that the study employed were: the circuit of origin for
the case, the issue area of the case, the type of petitioner, the type of respondent, the
ideological direction of the lower-court ruling, and whether the petitioner argued that a
law or practice was unconstitutional.
83
See id. at 1185 ("The prediction results suggest that the experts relied on highly
general attitudinal assumptions to supplement their assessment of legal factors .... ").
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identify those same predilections when making their own predictions. 84 Consistent with this latter supposition, the researchers found
that the experts performed comparably to the model (indeed, slightly
better) in predicting the votes of individual Justices overall, but that
the model did much better at predicting "swing votes," where the researchers fairly suspected that the complex and idiosyncratic preferences of Court moderates were too difficult for the experts to divine
without the benefit of a computer model.8 5 Rather than thinking
about this study as another data point in a dichotomous debate over
the primacy of law or attitude in Supreme Court decision making, the
authors suggested that the complex interplay between law and attitude the study revealed may warrant a reconceptualization of law itself: "[U]nder any theoretical conception that regards law as
consisting at least in part of what judges do, proxies that reliably predict what they will do in the future are worth considering as baselines
or guideposts of 'law,' whether or not we can imagine them as 'law'
themselves." 86
Recent studies of related issues have further underscored the
need for an increasingly hybridized and eclectic understanding of Supreme Court decision making. Academic lawyers have begun to explore the correlation between a judge's policy preferences and legal
preferences. 87 Thus, for example, conservative Justices typically favor
methods of constitutional or statutory interpretation-such as
originalism or textualism-that yield conservative policy outcomes. 8 8
The net effect of this insight is twofold: first, it shortens the analytical
distance between law and attitude; and second, it suggests the possibility that on those infrequent occasions when legal and policy preferences diverge, institutional rule of law norms could lead Justices to
opt for the former-which may explain at least some case outcomes
that statistical models do not predict. 89
In a related vein, studies of precedent conducted in the 1990s by
attitudinal scholars confirmed what lawyers had long suspected-that
See id.
Id. at 1184-85 ("[T]he experts' accuracy rate by individual Justice was markedly
higher at the ends of the Court's ideological spectrum than it was in the middle .... That
the legal experts have difficulty with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy is hardly surprising....What is needed is a more systematic and nuanced recognition of the voting patterns ... and this is difficult for human experts to discern from case-by-case analysis.").
86
Id. at 1191 (emphasis omitted).
87
See Kim, supra note 50, at 404-05 (arguing that judges have legal preferences in
84
85

addition to policy preferences); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive
Theory ofJudges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769, 786 (2008) (arguing that the interpretive theories a justice adopts affects case outcomes).
88
See Volokh, supra note 87, at 784-85 (discussing how judges may use a method of
interpretation to yield a preferred outcome).
89 Professor Volokh, in contrast, speculates that the opposite may also be true-that
Justices will change their legal preferences to achieve preferred policy outcomes. Id.
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there is typically precedent on both sides of close cases, and that a
Justice will usually rely on precedent that supports a result consistent
with his ideological preferences. 90 More recent work, however, has
added important qualifications by exploring the role that respect for
precedent plays in preserving the Court's institutional legitimacy and
by differentiating between run-of-the-mill precedent, which is often
manipulated in the service of implementing policy objectives, and
more enduring "super" precedent that constrains Court decision making in identifiable ways. 9 1 Finally, two studies with overlapping authorship found that the ideological preferences of most Justices "drift"
over time. 92 Apart from complicating the task of correlating a Justice's votes to her political predilections at a particular moment in
time, the incidence of ideological drift begs the questions of why it
occurs, whether changing policy preferences correlate to changing legal preferences, and, if so, which is the chicken and which the egg?
Such questions take on added relevance in light of other research
finding that the Court is most likely to render "consequential" decisions, that is, decisions with a greater impact on the law, when the
preferences of the majority are homogeneous, which liberates the
opinion writer to speak more stridently without fear of losing his or
93
her majority.
2.

Studies in Law and Politics: The Lower Courts

Early attitudinal studies focused on the U.S. Supreme Court,
which made sense. To show that a judge's view of what the law (or
public policy) should be influences her view of what the law is, the Supreme Court-which decides close cases where the law is unclear and
has declared itself "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Consti90
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 55, at 44-49 (arguing that the validity of precedents
turns on the preference of the majority of the court); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 16-17 (1999) (discussing how judges selectively use facts and law to support a result

they had already reached).
91
MICHAELJ. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 177-78 (2008) (discussing super
precedents as those so deeply embedded in law that they are immune to being overturned); THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIcGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT 19-23 (2006) (discussing that the Court cites precedents to legitimize
its decisions).
92
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, IdeologicalDrift
Among Supreme CourtJustices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1483, 1504
(2007) (finding drift among twenty-two of twenty-six Justices, with twelve becoming more
liberal, seven more conservative, and three drifting "in more exotic ways"); Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 365, 365 (2007) (finding drift among fourteen of sixteen justices who served on
the Court for more than ten years).
93 Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity in
Generating Consequential ConstitutionalDecisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 381 (2008).
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tution"9 4-is an obvious place to start. But it was generally understood that the findings of Supreme Court studies did not necessarily
extend to district and circuit courts, where judges 'are subject both to
appellate review and possibly to a different set of norms that respect
95
the constraints of controlling precedent.
In the 1990s, attitudinal scholars posited that lower-court judges
acted as agents for the Supreme Court by implementing the latter's
policy preferences, on pain of reversal. 9 6 To explain how the Supreme Court controlled the lower courts despite low rates of reversal,
some political scientists theorized that the Supreme Court establishes
"doctrinal intervals" within which circuit courts may deviate from the
Supreme Court's preferred policy outcomes without reversal and that
circuit judges act on their own policy preferences strategically, by implementing them to the extent they come within the confines of those
intervals. 97 Consistent with core tenets of the attitudinal and strategic
choice models, neither approach acknowledged law or legal norms as
meaningful constraints on lower-court decision making.
More recent work, however, has added to the factors influencing
lower-court decision making. In his groundbreaking studies of circuit
courts, Cross found that "[] udicial decision making clearly involves a
mix that includes some ideological influence, considerable legal influence, and undoubtedly other factors."9 8 As to ideology, he found that
while it "appears to be a factor in judicial decision making ....
the
available evidence can demonstrate only that it is a relatively small
factor."99 Cross found across studies of standards of deference in appellate review, 10 0 "procedural thresholds" (e.g., justiciability requirements),10 1 and adherence to precedent' 0 2 that "[flor every legal
variable amenable to quantitative study, there was consistently a statis94 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
95 See Kim, supra note 50, at 387-88 (noting that the lower courts' relationship to law
is quite different from the Supreme Court's because the Supreme Court is not strictly
bound by precedents of any kind).
96 E.g., Donald R. Songer, Jeffery A- Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of
Justice: Testing a Principal-AgentModel of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 673, 675 (1994).
97 McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory ofJudicialDoctrine and the Rule of
Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1631, 1639 (1995).
98 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF AFPEALS 177 (2007).
99

Id. at 28.

100 Id. at 51, 228 (finding results "generally consistent with what the legal model would
dictate" and concluding that "just one legal standard, affirmance deference to the lower
court decision, is consistently significant statistically and by far the most important single
variable substantively in explaining circuit court outcomes").
101 Id. at 228-29 ("[The] interposition of a legal threshold requirement obviously had
a significant effect on judicial decisions").
102
Id. at 122 (arguing that the extent of circuit court compliance with Supreme Court
precedent "might be considered evidence of remarkable power for the legal model").
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tically significant association that was robust to different samples and
10 3
control variables."
Consistent with Cross's research on circuit courts, studies of district courts have likewise concluded that legal norms help to explain
compliance with the decisions of higher courts. 10 4 In situations where
the risk of reversal is high, it may be difficult to tell whether a district
court's compliance with higher court precedent is animated by fear of
reversal or respect for the rule of law, 10 5 but as Pauline Kim argues in
a powerful essay, where lower-court discretion is broader, respect for
legal norms may better explain the continued allegiance of district
courts to higher-court precedent. 10 6 Similarly, in their study of religious-liberty cases, Professors Gregory Sisk and Michael Heise acknowledge that "political ideology may play a role at the margins in
deciding certain types of controversial court cases," but conclude:
"[T]o suggest that partisan or ideological preferences are prevalent
influences in deciding most cases or are invariably powerful variables
in deciding even the most controversial and open-ended of legal is10 7
It
sues is a dubious extrapolation from the empirical evidence."
would miss the point, however, to employ such statements in support
of an argument that law is "winning" its competition with ideological
preferences for control of lower-court decision making; rather, the
critical conclusion is one drawn by Sisk, Heise, and Andrew Morriss in
an earlier study of district-court decision making, that "as is often the
case with empirical research, our study provides both comfort and
challenges to all camps, again reminding us that judicial behavior is
l0 8
too complex for easy conclusions about influences and patterns."

Id. at 228-29.
See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 683 (2004)
(finding that lower-court standing decisions are "above politics when lower federal courts
are subject to clear and unambiguous standing rules and when effective judicial monitoring exists").
105
See Kim, supra note 50, at 427 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing whether
lower courts follow Supreme Court precedent "because of legal norms" or because "they
fear reversal").
106
Id. at 390 (challenging the principal-agent model's "assumption that lower federal
courts have a duty to follow the preferences-not merely the precedents-of the Supreme
Court"); see also David E. Klein & RobertJ. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower
Court Compliance, 37 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 579, 602 (2003) ("Another possibility strikes us as
especially likely-that congruence flows from lower-court judges' attempts to reach legally
sound decisions.").
107
Sisk & Heise, supra note 12, at 746.
108 Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
judicial Mind: An Empirical Study ofJudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1498 (1998).
103

104
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Studies in Law and Economics, Social Psychology, and Cognitive
Psychology

The number of "camps" highlighting different influences onjudicial decision making is proliferating. Within the economics camp
(separate and distinct from the rational-choice cohort in political science, discussed earlier) scholars have struggled to overcome the "embarrassment" of "explain[ing] judicial behavior in economic terms,
when almost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation
and other terms and conditions of judicial employment is to divorce
judicial action from incentives.., that determine human action in an
economic model."10 9 To overcome this problem, they have defined
self-interest more broadly and posited that judicial decision making is
variously influenced by desires to maximize popularity, power, prestige, public interest, affirmance, reputation, and voting as a source of
judicial utility. 110 Consistent with this broader definition, recent empirical work has sought to show how self-interested judges may adjust
their decision making to increase their chances for appointment to a
higher court.' 1 By defining self-interest to include the desire to win
approval from different audiences, law and economics encroaches on
the neighboring camp of social psychology. In Judges and their Audiences, for example, Lawrence Baum argues that judges can be influenced not only by the rule of law, their political preferences, or the
strategic means to implement those preferences, but by personal considerations too, such as the aspiration to be well-regarded by fellow
112
judges, the legal community, the media, and the general public.
One empirical study, for example, found that circuit courts are more
likely to adopt as precedent the rulings of prestigious judges.1 13
Notwithstanding an emerging scholarly consensus that law, policy
preferences, and other factors combine to influence judicial decision
making, one gleans none of that from reading judicial opinions,
109 Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
110 Id. at 13-23 (reviewing the factors that contribute to judges' utility and arguing that
voting as a source ofjudicial utility is the most important); see also Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious DeterminantsofJudicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615,
619-36 (2000) (identifying limitations in Posner's approach and extending it to reputational motivators affecting Supreme Court Justices specifically).
111
Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signalingand Precedent in FederalDistrict Court Opinions, 13 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 63, 96 (2005); see also Mark A. Cohen, The
Motives of Judges: EmpiricalEvidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13,
26-27 (1992) ("An examination of all federal antitrust sentences from 1955 to 1981 finds
that promotion potential does explain a significant portion of the variance in corporate
criminal antitrust penalties.").
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAV112
IOR 50, 60, 97, 135 (2006).
113
David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of IndividualJudges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 391 (1999).

2012] CAN THE RULE OF LAW SUR VIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS?

213

which convey the impression that law alone drives the opinion writer
inexorably to the conclusion reached. Are judges dissembling, delusional, or something else? While attitudinal scholars borrow heavily
from behavioral psychology in positing that judges' political attitudes
cause judges to vote consistently with their attitudes, they have been
largely indifferent to why'1 4-a question of cognitive psychology that
a cadre of psychologists, law professors, and political scientists began
to explore in earnest as another component of the new quantitative
15
moment at the turn of the twenty-first century.
Recent, multidisciplinary study of what judges do is most inter1 16
ested in "hard" cases, "when facts give rise to legal indeterminacy,"
that is, when specific outcomes are not clearly dictated by applicable
law. As Lawrence Wrightsman explains, in such cases, ajudge's preexisting attitudes "can affect the forming of impressions, the evaluating
of evidence, and the making of decisions."' 1 7 Judges may thus engage
in "motivated reasoning" in which their analysis of applicable law can
be influenced by their political or other predilections.'1 8 When
judges are confronted by credible arguments for a conclusion contrary to the one that they are motivated to make, Dan Simon adds that
the "cognitive system imposes coherence on the arguments so that the
subset of arguments that supports one outcome becomes more appealing to the judge and the opposite subset, including arguments
that previously seemed appropriate, turns less favorable." 1 9 As a consequence, the "factual patterns, the authoritative texts, and the resulting propositions are restructured," which "spreads apart the opposing
arguments" and enables one decision to become "dominant over the
0
other."12
Cognitive psychology therefore suggests that judges may not be
motivated by a desire to implement their ideological or other predi114
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 8, at 433 ("The attitudinal position on motivated reasoning is one of agnosticism. What matters is that the justices' ideology directly influences
their decisions. Whether the justices do so with self-awareness ... doesn't matter.").
115 See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
116
Evan R. Seamone, JudicialMindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1030 (2002).
117

LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN,JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT? 55

(1999).
118
Id. at 55-56; see also EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS & PERCEPTION: How POLICY
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 13-40 (2009) (outlining a theory of motivated
reasoning and exploring potential weaknesses); Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial
Behavior: Expanding the Scope of Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 3,
5 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box:

Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 541-42 (2004) (exploring motivational reasoning in several contexts where people distorted facts to ensure a
desired outcome).

119

Dan Simon, A Psychological Model ofJudicialDecision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 20

(1998) (emphasis omitted).
120
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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lections and may sincerely believe that their rulings are grounded in
an analysis of law alone, even though their predilections influence
their rulings. 12 In the separate but related subfield of heuristics, several scholars have studied the ways in which judicial reasoning can be
unwittingly influenced and distorted by cognitive biases or illusions
that can occur when the mind takes shortcuts in the reasoning
122
process.
Much remains to be done in the ongoing, multidisciplinary empirical movement to analyze influences on judicial behavior-particularly in understudied state courts, which adjudicate 98% of the
nation's caseload. 123 Nevertheless, there is an emerging consensus
that judges are subject to an array of factors that influence their interpretations of law, including but not limited to applicable legal text.
More fundamental, perhaps, is the idea that this empirical work informs and deepens conceptions of law itself-conceptions transcending antiquated notions of law as mathematical formulas that
dictate invariable outcomes and embracing law as elastic vessels that
constrain available choices while accommodating, if not incorporating, a variety of extralegal influences.
II
THE PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE ON WHAT JUDGES Do:
SIMPLISTIC AND DICHOTOMOUS

While the new empiricists have inched toward an emerging consensus as they strive to capture the complexity and nuance of judicial
decision making, the disputants in public policy debates have kept it
divisive and simple. The most intense of such debates are cyclical affairs, triggered by political realignments, in the aftermath of which
121
See BRAMAN, supra note 118, at 4-5 ("[P]sychological research indicates that decision makers may not always be aware of how alternative motives influence their reasoning
processes .... "); C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 158 (1996) (proposing a conceptual model that "rejects... the axiomatic
assumption of attitudinal models. . . that judicial judgment is motivated by the judge's
personal policy preferences").
122
See generally Chris Guthrie, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: HowJudgesDecide Cases, 93 CORNELL. L. REv. 1 (2007) (discussing the role and implications of intuitive "snap judgments" in judicial decision making); Chris Guthrie, JeffreyJ.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001)
(discussing anchoring, framing, hindsight, representative heuristic, and egocentric biases);
JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive PsychologicalTheory ofJudging in Hindsight,65 U. CHI. L. REv.
571 (1998) (arguing that, in many cases, the law understands and adapts to ameliorate
hindsight biases); JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignoranceor Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REv. 61 (2000) (identifying areas in which the legal system has succeeded
or failed in adapting to common human cognitive biases); AndrewJ. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, CanJudges Ignore InadmissibleInformation? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251 (2005) (reporting experimental results that
suggest judges generally are influenced by relevant but inadmissible evidence).
123
AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 19, at viii.
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leaders of the new regime criticize and threaten unpopular, holdover
judges of the old regime, eliciting a counterstrike from court

supporters. 124
At the federal level, the most recent of these cycles began after
the Republican Party retook control of the Senate and House of Representatives in 1994.125 It was then that conservative Republican leaders (and like-minded organizations and commentators) embarked on
a campaign to thwart liberal "activist" judges, proposing to impeach
and remove targeted jurists, eliminate federal-court jurisdiction over
issues that had yielded controversial decisions, disestablish miscreant
courts, cut judicial budgets, and prevent the appointment of "liberal"
Clinton nominees. 12 6 After the election of George W. Bush in 2000,
Senate Democrats responded in kind, exploiting a range of procedural devices to stall or reject Bush nominees deemed too conservative.' 27 In response, public officials (including judges), organizations,
pundits, and others sympathetic to the plight of the courts criticized
the critics and called for an end to the attacks.' 28 In 2006, Democrats
regained control of Congress, conservative court critics fell from
129
power, and the cycle wound down.
The point for purposes here, however, is that the two sides in this
debate were animated by polarized visions of howjudges decide cases.
In one corner are court critics, whose views ofjudicial decision making (at least the decisions that concern them) reflect a dark, naive
hybrid of the attitudinal model, and in the other corner are the legal
establishment and its defenders, whose views of what judges do are
driven by a hopeful, equally naive version of the legal model.
A.

Court Critics and Their Vision of Judicial Decision Making

"Court critics," as I use the term here, do not encompass all who
are critical of isolated decisions rendered by a given court (which
124

Charles Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Congress Conflicts, in THE POLITICS OF JUDI-

CIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 19, 19-20 (Bruce Peabody ed.,

2010).
125

For a more elaborate discussion of the events summarized in this paragraph, see

CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE
OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3-5, 260-82 (2006).
126
See id. at 3-6.
127
Id. at 5-6.

FOR CONTROL

128 Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreward to GEYH, supra note 125, at vii, x ("The best defense against these threats is the maintenance and expansion of our precious legacy: a
political culture in which such threats are simply unacceptable . .. ."); William S. Sessions
& Charles Gardner Geyh, Save the Judges!: This Time PartisanAttacks on the Judicial Branch
Have Gone Too Far,LEGAL TIMES, July 24, 2006, at 59 ("[E]arlier attacks did not succeed, in
no small part, because those who wanted to preserve an independent judiciary .. countered the attacks. if we are to preserve fair and impartial courts, we must be prepared to
defend them again.").
129 Geyh, supra note 124, at 41.

216

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:191

would include nearly everyone). Rather, the term refers to those who
are critical of the courts generally, including those whose general disquietude is a response to court decisions in isolated cases.
In the latest cycle of anticourt sentiment, court critics have expressed outrage atjudicial decisions-most often those that invalidate
popularly enacted legislation-and have argued that in those cases,
the decision makers have disregarded the law and implemented their
personal preferences. Former Judge Robert Bork, for example, complained that the nation is "increasingly governed not by law or elected
representatives, but by unelected, unrepresentative, unaccountable
130
committees of lawyers applying no law other than their own will."
Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum characterized the problem as
one in which 'judges have decided to go off on their own tangent and
disobey the statutes of the United States of America." 131 And the
Center for a Just Society opined that " [t]here is nothing wrong with
our existing federal and state constitutions. What is wrong is that
judges are wrongly misrepresenting the requirements of these documents. Indeed, they are rewriting the documents by misconstruing
13 2
them in order to satisfy their own social and political agendas.
Proceeding from the assumption that too often judges disregard
the law and implement their ideological preferences, court critics
have argued that only by curbing the freedom of "activist" judges can
the rule of law be preserved. "If we're going to preserve our Constitution," declared Congressman Steve King, "we must get them in
line."13 3 Similarly, in proposing legislation calling on federal judges

to report their deviations from federal sentencing guidelines to Congress, Representative Tom Feeney opined that his amendment followed from the "simple precept" that 'judges should follow, not make
the laws," and that "if insisting upon that precept 'intimidates' federal
judges, then perhaps that is a good thing. '13 4 The critics have thus
often looked favorably on methods of court control, such as impeachment, jurisdiction stripping, or budget cutting-methods condemned
35
by court defenders-as means to promote judicial accountability.]
Their stated goal is for judges to exercise 'judicial restraint," as exemplified (in their view) by the decisions of Supreme Court conserva-

H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 9 (2003).
Marcus, supra note 7 (quoting Santorum).
Connor, supra note 14.
132
133
Marcus, supra note 7 (quoting King).
134
Tom Feeney, Letter to the Editor, Rep. Feeney Defends Measure to Thwart Sentencing by
Whim, PALM BEACH DAILY BuS. REV., Apr. 28, 2003, at A7.
135
See GEYH, supra note 125, at 3-4, 273 (citing examples).
130
131
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tives, such as Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia.13 6 At the
state level, they often oppose appointive systems and favor the selection ofjudges by means of contested elections, which enables voters to
hold judges accountable for their decisions (and purge the judiciary

of "activists")

137

The notion that independent judges disregard the law and implement their policy preferences sounds a lot like the attitudinal model.
But court critics do not claim that all judges do that-just the bad
ones. 138 In that respect, their position is at odds with the attitudinal
model, which posits that judges generally act on their policy preferences and is indifferent to whether such action is undesirable.1 3 9 The
relevant point here, however, is that the critics' conception ofjudicial
decision making is dichotomous: the world is divided between "good"
judges who follow the law (practitioners of judicial restraint), and
"bad" judges who follow their preferences (practitioners of judicial

activism).
B.

The Legal Establishment and Its Vision of Judicial Decision
Making

Judges and court defenders proceed from the categorical premise that judges do not make but follow the law. Iowa Chief Justice
Louis Lavorato's comments are illustrative: "In our system of government, we expectjudges to rule according to the law regardless of their
1 40
personal views."
Proceeding from the premise that judges follow the law, court
defenders argue that judicial independence is essential, because it insulates judges from external interference with their impartial judgment that could corrupt the rule of law. For example,Justice Stephen
Breyer has opined, "IJ]udicial independence revolves around the
theme of how to assure that judges decide according to law, rather
than according to their own whims or to the will of the political
branches of government." 141 The remarks of numerous other judges
136
Id. at 3-4, 206 ("President George W. Bush was on record as saying that he supported the appointment of justices like Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia-two of the
Court's most predictable conservatives .... ").
137
Symposium, The Debate overJudicialElections and State CourtJudicialSelection, 21 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1347, 1379-80 (2008); Editorial, The ABA Plots a JudicialCoup, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 14, 2008, at A12.
138
See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
139
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
140
Press Release, Iowa Judicial Branch, Chief Justice Reacts to Judicial Questionnaire
(Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.iowacourts.gov/news-service/news-releases/Newsltem221/
index.asp.
141
Stephen G. Breyer, JudicialIndependence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U. LJ. 989,
989 (1996).
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echo Justice Breyer's sentiments. 142 Similarly, the Constitution Project declares that "[j]udges are supposed to be responsive only to the
rule of law and the Constitution, not to majority will or public, political, or media pressure," 14 3 while a report of the Defense Research In-

stitute adds that "[f] or our system to work, a judge must be free to
make decisions based on the facts and law without undue influence or
interference."144
Accordingly, court defenders oppose proposals to control judicial
decision making-for example, by cutting court budgets, trimming
court jurisdiction, impeaching errant judges, disestablishing unpopular courts, or withholding judicial pay raises-as an effort to intimidate judges that threatens judicial independence and the rule of
law. 145 They are dismissive of critics' complaints of "activism," which
they relegate to the status of a label signifying little more than disagreement with court decisions. 146 They often condemn judicial selection in partisan elections, because, in the words of an American Bar
Association (ABA) report, "the administration of justice should not
turn on the outcome of popularity contests," and a "good judge"
should be "independent enough to uphold the law impartially, without regard to whether the results will be politically popular with
47
voters."1
To protectjudicial independence and the rule of law from incursion, court defenders consistently advocate some variation on the
theme that courts and judicial systems must be depoliticized. The
ABA's Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary declared categorically that its mission was to "defuse the escalating partisan battle over
American courts." 148 In the realm of state judicial selection, some reformers propose to "take politics out of the system by setting up nonpartisan elections;" 149 others advocate for public funding of judicial

142 Charles Gardner Geyh, Panel, Straddlingthe FenceBetween Truth and Pretense: The Role
of Law and Preference in Judicial Decision Making and the Future of Judicial Independence, 22
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v, 435, 444-45 (2008)

(quoting Judges Samuel L.

Bufford, Julie A. Robinson, and Louraine C. Arkfeld).
143

THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE NEWSROOM GUIDE TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

7

(2006), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/37.pdf.
144

DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: A REPORT BY DRI's JUDICIAL

TASK FORCE 11 (2007).
145

O'Connor, supra note 128,

146

Am. BAR ASS'N, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE

at x.

ABA

COMMISSION ON

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, at vi (1997) ("'[A]ctivism' has become

a code word for a personal, political or ideological difference with a particular decision.").
147
148

AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 19, at 70.
Id. at 4 (quoting ABA President Afred P. Carlton Jr.).

149 Michael Dayton, ChiefJustice Lake Defends Latest Changes inJudicial Code in N.C., N.C.
LAW. WKLV., Oct. 20, 2003 (quoting Judge James A. Wynn Jr.).
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elections to "take politics out of judicial races;" 150 and still others
would replace judicial elections with an appointive system to "depoliticize the judicial process. 1 5 1 With respect to federal judicial selection, the ABA has advocated the use of nominating commissions
for federal judges to "alleviate excesses" of the "polarized combat that
fosters the view that judges are in office simply to carry out ideological
152
Similarly, we
agendas of those involved in putting them there."
153
hear calls to "take politics out of the debate over judicial salaries"
and to depoliticize the rhetoric ofjudicial criticism generally, because
"if this current, often politically motivated drumbeat against judges
continues unchallenged, more and more people... will lose faith not
1 54
just in the courts but in the rule of law itself."
Despite the often one-dimensional rhetoric that independent
judges follow the law and nothing else, it would be a mistake to assume that court defenders are members of law's answer to the flatearth society, who truly believe that divining the law is a mechanical
process divorced from other influences. To the contrary, court defenders acknowledge the role of policy preferences in judicial decision making.1 5 5 Thus, for example, in discussing the "enduring
principle[ ]" that "U] udges should uphold the rule of law," the ABA's
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary concedes that "the notion
that constitutional or statutory law is sufficiently fixed and clear that
judges can invariably define its meaning uninfluenced by their personal or political experience is increasingly unrealistic."' 5 6 Notwithstanding such concessions, however, court defenders doggedly adhere
to the simplistic premise that independent judges follow the law-period, which begs the question of why.

150
David Haynes, Sales Tax Case-Reform the System, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 17,
2008, at 10A.
151 Barbara Hoberock, Report Cites Need for Reform in Sentencing, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 1,
2008, at A13.
152

STANDING COMM. ON

FED. JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT 118, at I

(Aug. 2008), http://www2.americanbar.org/sdl/Documents/2008_AM18.pdf.
153 Gov. Paterson Commends Former Mayor Rudy Giuliani for Ideas on State Constitutional
Convention, U.S. FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 26, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12213475
(Westlaw) (quoting Governor Paterson).

154 Michael Traynor, JudicialIndependence: A Cornerstoneof Liberty, 37 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 487, 497 (2007) (quoting Judge Paul Friedman).
155 Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1715 (2007) ("We
judges must resist the temptation to assume that we are beyond the reach of the forces that
shape the mindsets and beliefs of our non-jurist peers.").
Am. BAR ASS'N, supra note 19, at 6-8.
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III
IMPEDIMENTS TO CONSENSUS IN THE PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE

Against the backdrop of the emerging consensus among scholars
that judges are subject to an array of influences, the stubbornly binary
public policy debate is puzzling. The notion that judges are complicated creatures whose decisions are variously influenced by law, ideology, strategic objectives, self-interest, and the audiences they address is
neither counterintuitive nor ground shaking. To understand why disputants in the policy debate have kept it simplistic and dichotomous, a
good starting place is with public opinion, which is, after all, what the
public policy debate seeks to sway.
A.

Public Opinion and Its Role in the Policy Debate

Making sense of public perception is enormously complicated.
Some people care about what courts do more than others. Some
know more about what courts do than others. Some have more experience with the courts (as jurors, witnesses, or litigants) than others.
And because courts are not monolithic, it is possible that differences
between court systems engender differences in public perception of
judges and courts. Finally, survey data are subject to the vagaries of illphrased questions, competing interpretations, and researcher bias. In
short, any discussion of survey data must be accompanied by an
asterisk.
That said, it would seem that the public thinks judges are subject
to an eclectic array of influences, consistent with the emerging scholarly consensus. First, the public thinks judges are fair and impartial
arbiters of law. In a survey conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
Research Inc. in 2001, 79% of the respondents thought that "dedicated to facts and law" described judges well or very well, 76% thought
the same of the term "fair," and 63% of "impartial." 15 7 And 58%
agreed with the statement thatjudges "make decisions based more on
facts and law" than "on politics and pressure from special interests. '158
Second, the public thinks judges are influenced by their ideologies. The same 2001 survey found that 76% of respondents thought
that "political" described judges "well" or very well. 15 9 In 2005, another national poll found that 85.5% of those surveyed thought that
judges' partisan backgrounds influenced their decision making some
157

GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE: FREQUENCY QUES-

5 (2001), http://faircourts.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf.
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Id. at 5.
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or a lot. 160 That 2005 survey found that 57.9% agreed with the statement that 'judges always say that their decisions are based on the law
and the constitution but in many cases judges are really basing their
decisions on their own personal beliefs." 161 And in 2006, yet another
survey found that 75% of respondents thought that judges were influenced by their personal political views to a great or moderate
162
extent.
Third, several polls reveal that around 80% of the public thinks
that elected judges are influenced by contributions they receive to
their campaigns. 163 Such a view is compatible with the strategicchoice, economic, and social psychology models. Devotees of strategic choice would presumably theorize that to further their long-term
interest in influencing public policy, judges strategically align their
votes with their contributors' preferences to the extent necessary to
win reelection; 164 proponents of an economic model would argue that
self-interested judges intent on retaining office and political power
may make decisions necessary to perpetuate their tenure; and advocates of a social psychology approach would identify contributors as
165
an attentive audience to whom judges may be responsive.
In addition, the public's understanding of "law" is merged with
politics in ways consistent with a broader and more flexible construction of law proposed by interdisciplinary scholars. One major study,
based on interviews with over 400 people, found that the public simultaneously regards law as disinterested, objective, and operating by
1 66
"fixed rules," and as "a game, a terrain for tactical encounters."
Consistent with this two-sided conception of law, one recent Kentucky
survey found that 62% of survey respondents think it is "very" or
"somewhat" important for judicial candidates to "state how they stand
on important legal and political issues as part of their campaign160

CAMPBELL PUB. AFFAIRS INST., MAXWELL SCH. OF SYRACUSE UNIV., LAW AND COURTS
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http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/camp-
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161
Id.
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THE ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., UNIV. OF PA., FAIR AND INDEPENDENT COURTS: A
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THE COURTS 3 (2006), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Releases/ReleaseCourts2006O928/CourtsSummary_20060928.pdf.
163 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why JudicialElections Stink, 64 OHIo. ST. L.J. 43, 54-55 &
nn.56-58 (2003) (citing polls from Texas, Ohio, and Pennsylvania).
164 Melinda Gann Hall, ElectoralPolitics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54J.
POL. 427, 428 (1992) ("To appease their constituencies, state supreme court justices who
have views contrary to those of the voters and the court majority, and who face competitive
electoral conditions will vote with the court majority instead of dissenting on politically
volatile issues.").
165 See supra notes 109-13 and accompany text.
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ing. 1 67 In other words, the public sees law and politics as interrelated
and favors holding judges accountable to the electorate for the political and legal views that animate their decision making.
At the same time, the public has retained considerable confidence in courts peopled with judges whose motives it regards as
mixed and favors insulating judges from external controls. A 2006
survey revealed that 64% of the public trusts the Supreme Court a
"great deal" or a "fair amount." 16 In another survey, 76% expressed
"some" or a "great deal" of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court,
followed by 74% for federal courts and 71% for state courts. 1 69 Moreover, in one survey, 71.9% thought that judges should be shielded
from outside pressure, 170 while in another survey, 83% thoughtjudges
17 1
should be shielded from congressional interference.
In short, the public has internalized what recent scholarship demonstrates-that judges are subject to legal and political influencesbut the public nonetheless continues to express considerable confidence in the courts. In that light, the pretense of the legal establishment's argument in the public policy debate, that judges are moved
by law and facts alone, seems otherworldly, unnecessary, and a bit silly.
172
The public-perception landscape is, however, more complicated.
Citizens may think that judges are influenced by extralegal considerations, but that does not mean citizens like it. As Professor Keith Bybee
reports, "Polls show that large majorities of Americans expect federal
judges to apply the law impartially and distrust judges who advance
narrow ideological interests."1 73 Similarly, Professor James Gibson
found that nearly 72% of respondents in his Kentucky survey thought
it was "very important" for a good state supreme court judge to
167
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"strictly follow the law no matter what the people in the country may
74
want." 1

As a consequence, judges are well advised to stick to the rule-oflaw script. The 2005 confirmation of ChiefJustice John Roberts offers
a useful illustration. Roberts' conservative political bent was widely
reported, and Senate Democrats did their best to portray him as an
ideological extremist.' 7 5 The Democrats had succeeded with a similar
strategy in defeating the Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork
two decades earlier. 1 76 One critical difference, however, was the extent to which the two nominees hewed to the rule-of-law rhetoric.
Bork was quite willing to elucidate his judicial philosophy with the
Senate Judiciary Committee. 17 7 From his vantage point, he was
merely elaborating on his understanding of the law. In so doing, however, he made plain the influence that his ideology was likely to have
on the decisions he would be making as a Justice, which helped enable Senate Democrats and interest groups to sour the public-and
ultimately the Senate-on his candidacy. 178 Roberts, in contrast, like
every Supreme Court nominee to testify after Bork, was less forthcoming, declined entreaties to discuss his views on any legal issues, and
1 79
repeatedly sounded the theme that he would follow the law.
'Judges are like umpires," he testified. "Umpires don't make the
rules; they apply them."' 8 0 Against the backdrop of social science
learning detailed in Part I, the claim that the Supreme Court "applies," but does not "make," rules of constitutional law when it decides
hotly contested questions of first impression that have split the lower
courts is something of a whopper. And given the public's readiness to
174
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believe that judges are influenced by their personal views,' 8 1 it seems
unlikely that the public was so fatuous as to assume that Roberts'
widely publicized conservative ideology would have no bearing on his
decision making. Nevertheless, the ease with which ChiefJustice Roberts was confirmed was widely attributed to the appeal of his simple
82
and consistent rule-of-law message.
Most recently, in 2009, President Barack Obama indicated his intention to replace retiring Justice David Souter with someone who
possessed-among other qualities-"empathy."'' 1 3 The comment
drew a sharp rebuke from critics who claimed that empathy was
"code" for activism and had no place on a Supreme Court that should
decide cases with reference to applicable law alone.'8 4 When President Obama later announced the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor,
gone was any reference to empathy and in its stead was a statement
that stressed the nominee's commitment to the rule of law. l8 5 What
controversy surrounded her nomination was limited almost exclusively to prior statements she had made implying that judges are subject to extralegal influences (e.g., that a Latina judge might decide
matters differently-and better-than a white male, and that circuit
86
courts make policy).,
In short, while the public is well aware of extralegal influences on
judicial decision making, it does not approve of them. 18 7 That helps
to explain the continuing appeal of rule-of-law rhetoric and the
resonance of policy arguments aimed at discouraging ideological and
other influences. For their part, judges are acutely aware of the rela181 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
182 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, PanelApproves Roberts, 13-5, As 3 of 8 DemocratsBack Him: Senate
to Vote Next Week; ConfirmationLikely, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at Al (noting how Russell
D. Feingold, a Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee voting in favor of Roberts'
nomination, "said Judge Roberts had persuaded him that 'he will not bring an ideological
agenda' to the court"). For other explanations for the outcomes, see Steven Lubet, The
Alito Confirmation: How Democrats Lost the Political Battle, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 1,
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tionship between public perception and the judiciary's institutional
legitimacy, and to the extent the public wants judges whose commitment to the rule of law is unwavering, it behooves judges and the legal
establishment to profess such a commitment. 88
B.

Getting to the Bottom of the Ermine Myth

Waxing eloquent on the virtues of following the law and nothing
else, as the legal establishment is apt to do, is easy enough. Actually
striving to eliminate extralegal influences on judicial decision making,
however, is arguably a fool's errand because judges must inevitably
exercise discretion whenever applicable law provides no clear answers,
and such discretion is informed by extralegal influences. 189 To the
extent that the legal establishment perpetuates the view that judges
are moved by rules of law alone, they are indeed propagating a myth.
Scholars who describe the rule of law as myth or fiction often do
so in pejorative terms, arguing that the myth is an empty husk and
proposing that it be exploded or abandoned. 190 Such a myth-blasting
exercise would expose as exaggerated, if not fraudulent, a rule of law
that the legal establishment has long defended as the sole influence
on judicial decision making. That, in turn, would presumably render
the policy debate less dichotomous and more closely aligned with
scholarly understandings of what judges do. The ermine myth offers
two countervailing benefits, however, that must not be ignored-one
external and one internal.
The external benefit relates to the contribution the myth makes
to the judiciary's institutional legitimacy vis-A-vis the outside world:
public confidence in the judiciary is preserved by maintaining the
public's faith in the rule of law.191 One might argue that undermining the ermine myth by conceding a political court would not shake
188 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "avoid ... the appearance of
impropriety," with the accompanying comment explaining that "[p]ublic confidence in
the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of
impropriety." MODEL CODE OFJtUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007). Rule 2.2, in turn, states that
judges "shall uphold and apply the law;" insofar as failing to uphold and apply the law is
thus improper, creating the perception that judges do not uphold and apply the law (by
openly acknowledging that judges base their decisions on extralegal factors instead) gives
rise to an appearance of impropriety. Id. at R. 2.2.
189 One can define law flexibly enough to merge law with politics and characterize
these "extralegal" influences as legal ones. See Ruger et al., supra note 11; supra text accompanying note 11. In the context of a discussion of the public policy debate, however, I am
preserving the law-politics divide that animates the debate.
190 John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 199, 202 ("[T]he establishment of a truly free society requires the abandonment of the myth of the rule of law.").
191 See Bybee, supra note 173, at 312 (The fact that "[p]olls show that large majorities
of Americans expect federal judges to apply the law impartially and distrust federal judges
who advance narrow ideological interests" demonstrates the correlation between the public's perceived notion of the rule of law and their trust in the judiciary).
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public confidence in the courts because survey data discussed earlier
show that the public retains considerable confidence in the courts despite believing that judicial decision making is subject to ideological
and other influences. 19 2 But such an argument underestimates how
central public faith in the rule of law is to our political culture. As
Paul Kahn has written: "The rule of law may be our deepest political
myth. It is the foundation of our beliefs about our community as a
single people with a unique history, as well as our view of our individual obligations to the state." 193 Entertaining doubts about the rule of
law may be essential to preserving the myth's continuing vitality, but
abandoning faith altogether would come at a considerably greater
cost. 194 Gibson, for example, theorizes that in the absence of electoral

accountability, judges derive their legitimacy with the public from
their expertise. 195 To the extent that the public attributes a judge's
expertise to his or her experience and training in interpreting legal
texts, marginalizing the rule of law as a fiction could well undermine
the legitimacy of judges and the judiciary.
To this argument, skeptics may answer that preserving the legitimacy of the judiciary with a lie is cynical and wrong-but that assumes, incorrectly, that the rule-of-law myth is categorically untrue.
Myths fall on a continuum. At one end are total fabrications, for example, yarns of the unicorn or the fountain of youth. At the other
end are embellishments on stories the public generally embraces as
true, for example, exaggerated anecdotes from the battles of Troy or
the Alamo. To the extent that myths retain power over and above
their entertainment value, it is because they lie on the latter end of
the continuum. Few are galvanized by fantastic tales of leprechauns to
search for pots of gold at the base of rainbows, but stories exaggerating the virtue and wisdom of the founding fathers continue to engender patriotic commitment to the Declaration of Independence and
the U.S. Constitution as almost holy documents. When it comes to
the rule of law, there is a sizable kernel of truth at the core of the
ermine myth: law does influence judicial decision making, even if the
19 6
exclusivity of its influence is overstated.
The internal benefit, in contrast, concerns the impact of the ruleof-law "myth" on judges themselves. Insofar as judges are influenced
by the rule of law, preserving the "myth" that judges can be, are, and
192
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should be influenced by law alone perpetuates norms within the judiciary that foster a rule-of-law culture and, ultimately, greater allegiance to the rule of law itself.19 7 The judiciary's internal
commitment to the rule of law is most readily apparent in courtpromulgated codes of conduct, virtually all of which are based, to varying degrees, on the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct.'98 Such
codes serve both to advise judges of their ethical obligations and (in
state systems, at least) to articulate rules of conduct that judges disregard on pain of discipline or removal. 199 The preamble to the Model
Code ofJudicial Conduct begins: "The United States legal system is based
upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent
judiciary... will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.
Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of
2°
justice and the rule of law."

Model Code rule 2.2 directs that "a judge shall uphold and apply
the law, and shall perform all duties ofjudicial office fairly and impartially."2 01 A comment accompanying this rule adds that "[a]lthough
each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without
regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in
question." 20 2 Similarly, rule 2.4(B) states that "[a] judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment." 20 3 The
comment to rule 2.4 emphasizes that "[c]onfidence in the judiciary is
eroded if judicial decision making is perceived to be subject to inap20 4
propriate outside influences."

The cumulative effect of these rules and principles is to create an
institutional culture in which the rule of law is a first principle that the
legal establishment accepts as an article of faith and reflexively defends against challenge. As Judge Richard Posner observes: "Any
amount of political judging challenges orthodox conceptions of the
judicial process . . .and the attitudinalists have shown that there is

plenty at all levels of the American judiciary (though more, the higher
197
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the level)," which is "heresy to the legal establishment. ' 20 5 Although
such orthodoxy may seem divorced from reality, there is an inescapable logic to the assumption that judges who embrace the rule of
law as an article of faith are likely to take the rule of law more seriously than those who are agnostic.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that the
continued vitality of the ermine myth, for the public and judges alike,
turns on the perceived truth that lies at its center. Myths can move on
their continuum, however, and to the extent that embellished truths
come to be viewed as fabrications, the power of a myth to unify the
faithful is compromised: witness the Catholic Church's struggle to restore the confidence of Catholics in the piety of their priests after publicized reports of sexual misconduct among their ranks. 20 6 The peril
for the ermine myth, as discussed in Part IV, is that it could go the way
of the Yeti: whatever truth may have given rise to the myth in the first
place could ultimately be eclipsed by doubts that threaten to consign
it to the status of a bedtime story.
IV
THE FUTURE OF THE ERMINE MYrH: THREE SCENARIOS
In short, there is logic to the dichotomous character of the public
policy debate over what judges do and what to do about it. The public, like the academic community, understands that judges are influenced by legal and nonlegal factors in their decision making, but
seeks to discourage the latter. By preferring judicial aspirants who
profess an unwavering commitment to the rule of law, the public
hopes to select judges for whom the rule of law exerts greater gravitational pull, to reduce the likelihood that extralegal influences will
cause judges to deviate as markedly from their orbit. 20 7 The legal establishment, in turn, is well aware that the exercise of discretion requires judges to bring extralegal considerations to bear in their
decision making, 20 8 but is mindful of public perception and is acculturated to rule-of-law norms. 20 9 While judges and lawyers may thus
acknowledge multivariate influences on judicial decision making privately or even in stage whispers, they do so openly at the peril of undermining the ermine myth, a core premise of which is that
independent, impartial judges set extraneous influences to one side
205
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and follow the facts and law.2 10 To openly embrace the recent findings of social science research summarized in Part I is to concede the
rightness of critics' claims that judicial independence does liberate
judges to do more and less than follow the law. That concession effectively undercuts the longstanding justification for an independentjudiciary and leaves court defenders ill-equipped to counter arguments
that judicial decision making should be subject to greater political and
popular control. And so, defenders have stuck to their story.
The critical question becomes: What happens next? There are at
least three possibilities. At one extreme is nothing: independent
judges will continue to be influenced by law and extralegal factors, but
will say that they are influenced by law alone, and will do so with the
public's continued support-the ermine myth will remain intact and
unscathed. At the other extreme is a constitutional crisis: the judicial
establishment has already lost the public policy debate, and the public
is poised to lose its faith in an independent judiciary that it regards as
overtly politicized, indifferent to the rule of law, and unaccountable to
the public it serves-the ermine myth will die. In the middle (and
where I suspect we are most likely headed) is a gradual erosion of
rule-of-law norms: an increasingly cynical public will become less receptive to claims that judges are influenced by law alone and more
receptive to imposing greater popular and political controls on the
judiciary's independence-the power of the ermine myth will fade.
A.

The Possibility that the Dichotomous Public Policy Debate
Will Persist Without Consequence

There is a real possibility that academic and public policy debates
will continue on a parallel course without intersecting and without
meaningful consequence: the legal establishment and court critics will
continue their dichotomous wrangle, scholars will continue down a
different path toward nuance and consensus, and that will be that. In
defense of this prediction, one should not underestimate the awesome power of inertia. If nearly a century's worth of social science
research on what judges do has yet to influence what the legal establishment and court critics say judges do, 21 1 one may legitimately doubt
whether that is likely to change anytime soon. Moreover, it is important to understand that the exclusivity of the legal establishment's
commitment to the rule of law and its failure to embrace social science learning is not simply a matter of ignorance or stupidity. Rather,
it is attributable to a rule-of-law culture that the legal establishment
seeks to perpetuate internally and with the general public, to the end
210
211
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of preserving its institutional legitimacy.2 12 And the rule-of-law mantra continues to work: public confidence in the courts remains
high. 213 As long as the public embraces the rule-of-law myth as an
aspirational goal, is untroubled that the myth does not mirror reality,
and keeps its faith in the courts, court defenders may prefer to perpetuate that myth, in lieu of embracing the complexity and nuance of
social science research. Court critics, for their part, will persist in cyclical attacks on judges and the courts, to limited or no effect.
The prediction that the ermine myth is likely to persist unmolested into the foreseeable future, however, may extrapolate too
much from a snapshot. While at this moment in time the public retains confidence in judges who it thinks should be dedicated to the
rule of law alone, even as the public acknowledges that those same
judges are subject to extralegal influences, it is far from clear that that
this confluence of views is in a steady state. While the notions that
laws are malleable and judges corruptible have long been with us, the
pervasive sense that political ideology routinely influences judicial decision making is a more recent phenomenon, traceable to the legal
realist movement and its aftermath. 2 14 Even more recently, there
have been a range of widely reported developments that challenge the
rule of law and undermine its core premise that the facts and law are
all that matter to judges, in ways too obvious to ignore.
First, the conservative campaign against 'judicial activism" has received national attention for over a decade. As discussed in Part II,
beginning in the mid-1990s, court critics pervasively decried liberal
activist judges, whom they identified (implicitly and explicitly) as
judges who disregard the law and implement their own policy preferences. 2 15 There is some evidence that the campaign gained ground
with the public. In a 2005 survey, 56% of respondents agreed that
"U]udicial activism . . . seems to have reached a crisis" because
"Ij]udges routinely overrule the will of the people, invent new rights
and ignore traditional morality." 2 16 Liberal criticism of conservative
judges was more isolated, but the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore217 created a teaching moment of unparalleled proportions for
liberals determined to show that conservative judges too are subject to
212
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ideological influences.2 1 8 Polling data reveal that the Bush v. Gore case
did not result in a net diminution of public confidence in the Supreme Court. 2 19 Tellingly, however, confidence levels among Democrats declined as they increased among Republicans, suggesting that
the Court's performance was being evaluated in decidedly partisan
220
terms.
Second, when the media report on decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, they routinely group the votes of the Justices into ideological
blocs-liberal, conservative, or moderate (swing) votes. Press coverage of three recent cases is illustrative. In describing the Supreme
2
Court's 2008 five-to-four decision in District of Columbia v. Helley

1

-

which invalidated a D.C. gun-control law on Second Amendment
grounds-the press explained the outcome with explicit reference to
the Court's "liberal" and "conservative" Justices. 222 Similarly, in the
2009 case of Caperton v. A. T.Massey Coal Co. 223-a due process challenge to a state supreme court justice's failure to disqualify himself
from a case in which the CEO of a litigant had spent $3 million in
support of the justice's election while the litigant's case was pendingthe press reported on the majority's opinion as a product of its "liberal bloc." 2 24 And referring to Ricci v. DeStefano,225 a reverse-discrimi-

nation case brought by Caucasian and Hispanic firefighters who had
been denied promotions, the New York Times reported on Justice
Anthony Kennedy "writing for himself and the four members of the
[C]ourt's conservative wing." 226 The message is clear to all but the
hopelessly obtuse: to understand why Justices vote as they do, it is not
enough to understand their legal reasoning as reflected in the opinions they write; one needs to know their ideological orientations. Indeed, it is common for press reports to precede any discussion of the
Court's reasoning with a reference to the ideological alignment of the
Justices' votes, which implicitly underscores the primacy of ideology
relative to the rule of law.
218
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Third, beginning in the aftermath of Robert Bork's confirmation
proceedings, widely reported partisan battles over the appointment of
federal judges have underscored the proposition that ideology is of
critical importance in judicial decision making. Senate Republicans
resisted the confirmation of "liberal activist" judges nominated by
President Bill Clinton, 22 7 while Senate Democrats struggled to reject
"conservative extremists" nominated by President George W. Bush. 228
On the one hand, both political parties have putatively perpetuated
rule-of-law principles by arguing that their respective campaigns are
motivated by a desire to ensure that the President of the opposing
party does not appoint judges whose ideological bent is so extreme as
to interfere with their capacity to follow the law. 229 On the other
hand, the composite picture the confirmation battles paint is of ajudiciary staffed with left- and right-wing ideologues.
Fourth, there have been widely publicized episodes in which
judges have been criticized for failing to disqualify themselves from
hearing cases in which they had a personal interest that arguably impaired their capacity to follow the law. In 2004,Justice Scalia accepted
an invitation to join Vice President Dick Cheney for a weekend of
duck hunting in Louisiana, while a lawsuit against the Vice President
was pending before the Supreme Court. 230 Scalia subsequently declined to disqualify himself from hearing the case, and ultimately cast
his vote in the Vice President's favor. 23 1 Editorial writers reacted critically. One asked incredulously: "Would a rational person doubt that,
all things being equal, the judge just might tilt toward the man with
whom he is so 'well acquainted?' 23 2 Another added that "[t]he appearance of conflict is obvious and Scalia should recuse himself from
the case immediately in order to protect the credibility of the court's
233
eventual decision."
In a West Virginia Supreme Court race, judicial candidate Brent
Benjamin defeated incumbent Chief Justice Warren McGraw with the
support of over $3 million in independent expenditures from the
227 See Neil A. Lewis, Conservatives Set for Fight on JudicialNominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1992, at B16 (chronicling conservatives' preparations to combat judicial nominations
made by President Clinton).
228 Peter Baker, Parties Gear Up for High Court Battle, WASH. POST, June 27, 2005, at A2
(noting that administration opponents set up a "war room" to devise a strategy in anticipation of the retirement of Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist).
229 Sen. Kennedy Supports Filibusteron Nomination ofJudge Alito, U.S. FED. NEWS SERVICE,
Jan. 26, 2006, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 982178891; Cochran Will Not Support Kagan
Confirmation to Supreme Court, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., Aug. 4, 2010, available at
ProQuest, Doc. No. 2289437471.
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CEO of a coal company that was then poised to appeal a $50 million
verdict against it. 234 Justice Benjamin subsequently declined to dis-

qualify himself from hearing the coal company's case and later cast
the deciding vote in the company's favor. 23 5 One editorial writer observed that "the West Virginia case, while extreme, points to an alarming trend. It comes at a moment when judicial neutrality-and the
appearance of neutrality-basic to due process are under a growing
threat from big-money state judicial campaigns." 236 A second asked,
"If citizens believe that judicial office is for sale to the highest bidder,
237
why should they respect the rule of law?"

While these disqualification imbroglios do not bear on the role of
ideology in judicial decision making (and in the case of Justice Benjamin, his refusal to recuse was ultimately reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court),238 they fuel the public's suspicion that extralegal factors, such

as friendship and financial dependence, influence judicial decision
making. And implicitly, at least, the public does not approve. 2 39 Despite the prevailing rule that a judge is to decide his or her own disqualification motions, a rule grounded in the view that judges are
presumptively impartial and will follow the law, 81% of the public
thinks that a different judge should make such decisions, a view
grounded on a different presumption-that in such situations, extralegal influences risk subverting the rule of law. 240

In a similar vein,

roughly 80% of the public thinks that elected judges are influenced by
the campaign contributions they receive, 241 which, in turn, has ad24 2
versely affected public perception of the courts' legitimacy.

Fifth, and illustrated by the facts underlying the West Virginia disqualification case discussed above, the recent politicization of judicial
election campaigns has undermined the view that judges are simply
impartial arbiters of facts and law.2 43 Multimillion dollar judicial cam234

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2254 (2009).

235

Id.

236
237

Editorial, Justice Not for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A26.
David Merritt, Op-Ed., Judicial Credibility Is at Stake in Case, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 6,
2009, at 9A.
238
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2254.
239
See sources cited supra notes 230, 232, 236, and 237.
240
See Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, Poll: Huge Majority Wants Firewall
Between Judges, Election Backers (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press-releases.cfm/poll huge-majority-wants firewall-between-judges election_
backers?show=news&newsID=5677.
241
See Geyh, supra note 163, at 52 & n.47 (referring to the "Axiom of 80" and acknowledging that the percentages vary between jurisdictions and elections).
242
James L. Gibson, Campaigningfor the Bench: The Corrosive Effects of Campaign Speech?,
42 LAW & Soc'v REv. 899, 902 (2008) ("Contributions to candidates for judicial office imply for many a conflict of interest, even a quid pro quo relationship between the donor and
the judge, which undermines perceived impartiality and legitimacy.").
243
See James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy
Theory and "New Style"Judicial Campaigns,102 Am.POL. Sot. REv. 59, 72 (2008) (arguing that

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:191

paigns are now commonplace, in which state-wide television advertising dwells on which supreme court candidate will support or oppose
the death penalty, victim's rights, abortion, etc. 244 In 2002, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that judicial candidates have a First Amendment
right to announce their views on issues likely to come before them
later as judges on the purported grounds that such issues are what
judicial elections are about.2

45

Implicit in these developments is the

assumption that the hot-button issues judges decide present questions
of public policy that the electorate has a right to influence or control,
not just questions of law for legal experts (i.e.,judges) to resolve without interference. Knowing the policy predilections of judicial candi24 6
dates has become increasingly relevant in judicial campaigns:
witness the 2010 retention-election defeat of three Iowa Supreme
Court justices who previously ruled that the right of gay people to
24 7
marry was protected by the Iowa Constitution.

B.

The Possibility that the Legal Establishment Will Lose the
Dichotomous Public Policy Debate and Provoke a Crisis

The five developments detailed above have led many within the
legal establishment to warn of impending crises. Generally stated,
their concern is that the courts have been politicized to such an extent that the public is poised to lose faith in the rule of law and an
impartial judiciary. In a Law Day speech in 2005, a North Carolina
trial judge declared that "our democracy is at risk" and that "the very
separation of powers that has kept our democracy alive and vigorous is
in jeopardy" because "the constant, degrading and sometimes personal attacks on judges and the judiciary by political and other leaders
are slowly eroding the credibility of the judiciary and will ultimately, I
politicized judicial campaigning corrodes the legitimacy of state courts); see also Geyh,
supra note 163, at 54-55 (noting that multiple polls find that over 80% of the public believes that campaign contributions buy influence with judges).
244

See JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES & RACHEL WEISS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL

ELECTIONS 2006: How 2006 WAS THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO THE FAIRNESS AND
IMPARTIALITY OF OUR COURTS-AND How AMERICANS ARE FIGHTING BACK 16 fig.9 (Jesse

Rutledge ed., 2007) (finding that in 2005-06, candidates collectively raised more than a
million dollars in supreme court election campaigns in Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan,
North Carolina, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Washington); id. at 4 fig. 3, 13 fig. 8, 35
fig. 21 (showing an ad that highlighted an opponent's vote to set aside the death penalty
for a juvenile, one that claimed the candidate was for "victims and their families," and
another that touted a candidate's pro-life stance).
245
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002).
246 See Gibson, supra note 174, at 289 (citing polling research indicating that the public
thinks it is important for judges to express their views on major political and social issues).
247
A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of IowaJudges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010,
at Al.
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fear, undermine the rule of law." 248 More recently, Massachusetts

Chief Justice Margaret Marshall declared that "state courts are in crisis," due in part to the "politicization of state judiciaries.."249 As she

explained:
In the now hostile environment, every judicial decision can be
turned into a message of allegiance to-or failure to align withpartisan constituents, much like a legislator's voting record.... Fair
and neutral judges, knowing that each written opinion may be scrutinized as statement of political partisanship by interest groups, may
abandon
feel tremendous pressure to look over their shoulders, to250
cases.
deciding
when
neutrality,
judicial
of
the principles
In 2008, one respected academic commentator added that "the
institution of the elected judiciary is in trouble, perhaps in crisis," due
to the "intensity of electioneering," 2 51 and that same year, the Minnesota Chief Justice echoed that "[p]erceptions of fairness, equity, and
access will be dramatically undermined if the public's confidence in
the courts erodes, and it takes only one big, nasty election campaign
to seriously damage the hard-won public confidence that our judiciary
currently enjoys." 2 52 Of the federal appointments process, another
commentator has declared that "[p]ast ideological scrutiny

. . .

has

embittered many nominees, threatened judicial independence, discouraged individuals from enduring the confirmation process, and
contributed to the vacancy crisis in the federal judiciary."2 53 On a related front, yet another commentator has observed more generally
that "the judiciary is currently in crisis," because "the political process
has increased the role of partisanship in the selection of judges at all
levels," which has resulted in a "highly factionalized judiciary" that is
"less cordial in its internal relations and less likely to respect its independent institutional role as a professional community charged with
responsibility for enforcing the law in an equal, uniform and predict254
able manner."
Proclamations of an impending crisis of confidence in the courts,
however, are difficult to square with survey data revealing that public
248

Law Day Speech by N.C. Superior CourtJudge Thomas W Ross, N.C. LAw. WKLY., May 16,

2005, available at Academic OneFile, Doc. No. GALE A134519374.
249
Edward H. Pappas, JudicialIndependence in Crisis(Part 1), MICH. BARJ., May 2009, at
18, 18 (quoting Massachusetts Chief Justice Margaret Marshall).
250
Margaret H. Marshall, The Promise of Neutrality: Reflections on JudicialIndependence, 36
HUM. RTS. 3, 4 (2009).
251
George D. Brown, PoliticalJudges and PopularJustice: A Conservative Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2008).
252
EricJ. Magnuson, The State of theJudiciary,BENCH & BAR MINN., Aug. 2008, at 20, 23.
253
Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 513,
516-17 (2003).
254
Richard Lavoie, Activist or Automaton: The InstitutionalNeed to Reach a Middle Ground
in American Jurisprudence,68 ALB. L. REv. 611, 627 (2005).
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support for federal and state courts remains high.2

55

While recent

developments engender doubts as to the long-term stability of the
public's faith in courts and the rule of law, they lend little support to
dire predictions of imminent catastrophe.
C.

The Possibility that Public Confidence in the Rule of Law
and Judicial Independence Will Gradually Erode

There is a third possibility between the two extremes of inertia
and catastrophe: as the public continues to internalize the lessons of
legal realism, it will gradually grow more skeptical of claims that independent judges are committed to the rule of law and become more
receptive to arguments that judges should be subject to greater popular control. The sky will not fall; it will merely begin to sag-but that
development has nonetheless significant implications for the longterm future of the public policy debate over what judges do and how
they should be regulated.
Elsewhere, I have chronicled the emergence of judicial independence norms that evolved over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 256 Those norms embrace judicial independence as an
instrumental value that enables judges to uphold the rule of law by
buffering them from threats or controls that could interfere with their
25 7
impartial application of the law to the facts of cases before them.
As those norms became entrenched in the nineteenth century, they
tempered Congress's impulse to exploit the full range of its powers to
bend the judiciary to its will during cycles of intense, anticourt
258
sentiment.
The bench and bar remain committed to perpetuating judicial
independence norms, and because those norms are so deeply entrenched, they are unlikely to yield quickly to evidence challenging
the rule-of-law premises upon which those norms rest.2

59

Across a

range of contexts, the public has now been exposed to a way of looking at what judges do that proceeds from the fundamentally different
premise (corroborated by interdisciplinary research) that independent judges make decisions subject to a host of influences including,
but not limited to, the law. 2 60 If the legal establishment persists in its
one-dimensional defense of an independent judiciary that proceeds
from a premise the public increasingly regards as counterfactual, it is
255
256
257

See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.

See CE'H, supra note 125.
Id. at 279.
258 See id. at 52 (arguing that during the nineteenth century there was increasing congressional reluctance to use devices at Congress's disposal to retaliate against the judiciary
for its decision making).
259 See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 141, 160-67 and accompanying text.
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only a matter of time before the public and its elected representatives
reassess the value of an independent judiciary. Why give judges the
latitude to implement their personal, partisan, strategic, or ideological
preferences when we do not do the same for officials in the so-called
"political" branches of government?
The capacity of the human mind to live with cognitive conflict is
considerable, and it is quite possible for the public to abide a seemingly contradictory state of affairs in which judges uphold and disregard the rule of law-where the legal and the political struggle for
primacy. 2 61 There are, however, limits, and we have begun to see
hints of them. Perhaps most notable is that after fifty years in which
nearly half of the states changed their method of selecting judges
from contested elections to "merit selection" systems, the movement
toward appointive systems has stalled and begun to reverse. 26 2 Appointive systems derive their legitimacy from the expertise and rule-oflaw values they cultivate among judges so selected: judges appointed
on the basis of merit, the argument goes, can interpret the law expertly and impartially, insulated from fleeting majorities of the electorate intent on punishing judges for unpopular rulings. 263 But that
presupposes a public so confident of its judges' commitment to the
rule of law that it is prepared to relinquish its power to keep judges in
check through meaningful electoral accountability. The end of the
merit-selection movement, coupled with more recent efforts in meritselection states to revert to contested elections, is certainly suggestive
of a public that is gradually growing more skeptical of its judges'
motives.
Corroborative of this gathering skepticism is that, while the public's confidence levels in state and federal judiciaries generally remain
high, recent polling data reveal significant spasms of disquietude. As
previously noted, in a survey conducted in 2005, a majority agreed
with the statement that judicial activism had reached a "crisis
point. ' 264 Moreover, although significant majorities may be averse to
261
See Bybee, supra note 173 (concluding that such a contradiction is useful in determining the actual role of political and legal factors in judicial decision making); see also
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS, at x (1986) (observing
that insistence on a strictly legal model of judicial decision making "may seem ridiculous"
because "most thoughtful citizens know that the courts act decisively in creating rules that
promote political ends").
262
See Charles Gardner Geyh, The EndlessJudicial Selection Debate and Why It Mattersfor
JudicialIndependence, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1262 (2008).
263
See Geyh, supra note 163, at 54-55; see also Gibson, supra note 174, at 284 (arguing
that the legitimacy of elected judges is connected to "the extent that judges are deemed to
be experts in law who ably apply their legal training to decisions within the context of the
rule of law").
264
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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the "congressional interference" with judges, 265 a majority nonetheless agrees that judges whose decisions are repeatedly at odds with
voter values should be impeached.2 6 6 In yet another survey question
posed in 2005, 46% agreed with the statement that judges were "arrogant, out-of-control and unaccountable," as compared to only 38%
who disagreed. 267 Finally, in 2006, Princeton Survey Research Associates International reported that 64% of respondents agreed with the
proposition that "the courts in your state can usually be trusted to
make rulings that are right for the state as a whole;" when it asked the
nearly identical question in 2009, the percentage in agreement had
dropped to

42%.268

V
REORIENTING THE ERMINE MYrH

In short, the legal establishment appears to be between a rock
and a hard place. It can stick with the increasingly implausible story
that independent judges are influenced by facts and law alone, and
gradually lose its audience to court critics who will expose and decry
ideological influences on judicial decision making and clamor for
more popular and political controls. Or it can openly concede that
extralegal factors influence judicial decision making and gut the
raison d'etre for the judiciary's independence in one fell swoop. Either way, the ermine myth is a goner.
A.

The Ermine Myth and the Goals of an Independent Judiciary

There is, however, another way, which is to consider retooling the
ermine myth itself, in a way that renders it more compatible with what
modern judges do (thereby restoring the kernel of truth necessary for
the myth to retain its vitality), while preserving the essential norms
that underlie the myth's commitment to an independent judiciary.
The starting point is to think about whether and why modern judges
deserve a measure of independence: What instrumental values are furthered by an independent judiciary peopled with judges whose deciSee supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See Neil, supra note 216 (finding 56% of respondents agreed with this assertion).
267
Id.
THE ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 162, at 2; PRINCETON SURVEY RE268
SEARCH Assocs. INT'L, SEPARATE BRANCHES, SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES: A NATIONAL SURVEY
OF PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS ON SOLVINGJUSTICE ISSUES 21, 50 (2009), http://contentdm.ncIn the 2009
sconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ctcomm&CISOPTR=118.
survey, the question asked about "the state courts" instead of "the courts in your state." See
Question Wording, ANNENBERG PUB. POL'Y CTR. U. PA. 4 (Sept. 28, 2006), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Releases/ReleaseCourts2006O928/Courts_
Questions_20060928.pdf; PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT'L, supra.
265

266
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sions are subject to a range of influences, including but not limited to
applicable facts and law? There are at least three.
The Rule of Law Revisited. One justification for an independent
judiciary resurrects the rule of law in a modified form, and does so in
two different ways. First, insofar as law continues to influence judicial
decision making, judicial independence promotes the rule of law by
insulating judges who are predisposed to follow the law from public
officials or others who would coerce judges to reach preferred policy
outcomes. Such an argument is weakened by data showing that independence simultaneously liberates judges to disregard the law when
they are so inclined. 269 That counterpoint is a "winner," though, only
to the extent that the costs of autonomy, expressed in terms of the
unwelcome extralegal influences that judicial independence tolerates,
exceed the rule-of-law benefits that independence promotes. Moreover, the concern that judges may be more independent than necessary
to advance rule-of-law goals is less an indictment of independence per
se than a recognition of the need to temper independence with
accountability.
Second, one can define "law" more broadly to accommodate ideological and other influences. Few lawyers would argue that there is
but one "correct" answer to disputed legal questions; most would
freely acknowledge that the "rule of law" tolerates a range of acceptable answers in close cases. While conservatives and liberals may answer such questions differently, the answers nonetheless fall within the

ambit of law, broadly construed. While such a construction may infuriate social scientists intent on defining law precisely enough to differentiate its impact from other influences, a more capacious definition
of law better captures its meaning for the legal establishment. As Professor Stephen Burbank has wisely written, "I prefer the messiness of
lived experience to the tidiness of unrealistically parsimonious models."2 70 In this way, "law" does not dictate outcomes so much as circumscribe the range of acceptable outcomes.
Restructured, the rule-of-law justification for judicial independence is less ambitious than that touted by traditionalists. It makes no
claim that law dictates outcomes in close cases-only that law, broadly
understood, is a relevant influence on judicial decision making that
independence helps to preserve. The rule-of-law rationale for judicial
independence may be strongest in easy or routine cases, where the
impact of law on judicial decision making, when uncorrupted by dependence, is arguably the most pronounced. Although academics
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study ofJudicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and
Humility, in WHAT'S LAW GOT TO Do WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES Do, WHY THEY Do IT, AND
WHAT'S AT STAKE, supra note 173, at 41.
269

270
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dwell on hard cases, Judge Posner notes that "most cases are routine . . . rather than residing in that uncomfortable open region in

which judges are at large," and that "[t] he routine case is dispatched
with the least fuss by legalist methods." 27 1 Even in hard cases, independence from external interference with their decision making enables judges to offer their best judgment of what the law-flexibly
understood-requires.
Due Process. A second justification for an independent judiciary is
process oriented. Judicial proceedings include myriad safeguards that
regulate how information is gathered and decisions are made. Parties
are entitled to notice and a hearing-where they are afforded access
to counsel and given an opportunity to question witnesses subject to
rules of evidence-and they are guaranteed the right to an impartial
judge who must disqualify himself for bias and must not discuss the
case with others ex parte. 272 Such procedural safeguards assume that
judges will make decisions on the basis of information so obtained
and constrained, which in turn assumes that the judge is independent
enough to do so-meaning that the judge can resist pressure from
outsiders who would make a nullity of procedural safeguards by bending the judge to their will. Thus, as Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall have written, "[n] one of the core values of due process, however,
can be fulfilled without the participation of an independent
adjudicator."

273

To say that judicial independence promotes due process by enabling judges to conform their decision making to a process that follows procedural safeguards, however, is not to say that the decisions
judges make are or should be impervious to extralegal influences.
Judges who are insulated enough from external pressure to respect
litigants' due process rights still exercise discretion when evaluating
the information they receive and make decisions subject to a range of
influences, as Edward Rubin has explained: "[D]ue process does not
271
POSNER, supra note 18, at 46; see also Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore,
Pitfalls of EmpiricalStudies That Attempt to Understand the FactorsAffecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DuKE LJ. 1895, 1897 (2009) ("When the relevant legal materials are uncomplicated, the issues are uncontroversial, and precedent is clear, judges' deliberations are
straightforward and judgments are easily reached.")
272 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV, § 1; FED. R. EVID. 601-15; In re Stuhl, 233 S.E.2d
562, 568 (N.C. 1977) ("Ajudge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a
proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized
by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding."); MODEL CODE OFJUD. CONDUCt R. 2.9, 2.11 (A) (1) (2007);
JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, JEFFREY SHAMAN & CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICAL

CON-

DUCT AND ETHICS 2-23 (4th ed. 2007) ("Litigants have a right to expect ... that their case
will be heard in a public forum before an impartial judge or jury with representatives of
both sides present.").
273
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of

ProceduralDue Process, 95

YALE

LJ. 455, 476 (1986).
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demand that decisions exclude public policy considerations or that
they flow logically or definitively from the applicable rules. But it does
demand a certain type of decision making, specifically decision mak2 74
ing that is constrained by the established procedural protections."
Moreover, judicial independence not only enables judges to adhere to established procedural safeguards but is itself a procedural
safeguard that promotes public confidence in the administration of
justice and the legitimacy of government. Tom Tyler and others have
shown, across a range of contexts, that litigants who "fare poorly at
trial will not denigrate the judge or the system as long as they believe
their outcomes are fair ones reached by fair procedures." 275 A report

of the National Center for State Courts echoes that "perceptions that
courts use fair procedures and treat groups equally are the strongest
predictors of favorable evaluations of court performance.

'27 6

Judicial

independence, by ensuring that interested observers intent on intimidating judges into reaching desired outcomes do not dictate the
choices judges make, may thus be viewed as a procedural protection
that enhances due process and governmental legitimacy-even if the
decisions that independent judges make are influenced by legal and
extralegal considerations.

2 77

Excessive judicial independence can liberate judges to disregard
due process rights to the detriment of thejudiciary's legitimacy,just as
it can liberate them to disregard the rule of law. Again, however, such
a point does not refute the role independence plays in promoting due
process, so much as highlight the need to curb excessive independence with appropriate accountability. Thus, judges who disregard

274

Edward L. Rubin, Independence as a Governing Mechanism, inJUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
supra note 13, at 70.
275 Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluation of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 51, 69-70 (1984); see also TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J.
BOECKMANN, HEATHERJ. SMITH & YUENJ. Huo, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 82-83
(1997) (discussing how litigants will more often accept judgments resulting from what they
perceive to be fair procedures).
AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH,

276

DAVID B. ROTrMAN, RANDALL HANSEN, NICOLE MoTr & LYNN GRIMES, PERCEPTIONS

OF THE COURTS IN YOUR COMMUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY:

FINAL REPORT 60 (2003).

277 Tyler does not identify judicial independence per se as a factor contributing to
public confidence in court procedure, but it is implicit in several of the factors he does
identify, including the judge's efforts to be fair, the judge's honesty, the ethics of the
judge's conduct, and the judge's bias. Tom R. Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?:Criteria Used
by Citizens to Assess the Fairnessof Legal Procedures,22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 103, 121 (1988). If,
for example, a judge present himself as neutral and fair, but is thought to be under the
thumb of an energized legislature or interest group, the adverse impact on the judge's
perceived fairness, honesty, ethics, and bias seems plain.
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due process rights are subject to reversal, mandamus, and in extreme
278
cases (in state systems, at least) discipline and removal.
Justice. Even those who argue that judges are politicians in robes
must acknowledge an elemental difference between judges and legislators. Without disputing that judges, like legislators, can be "policymakers" in some sense of the term, judges, unlike legislators,
adjudicate cases between parties. In adjudicating cases, judges find
facts and reach conclusions of law to the ultimate end of administering justice. As a practical matter, when applicable law is clear and
binding on a court, the judicial role is so circumscribed by the rule-oflaw ideal that judges are expected to follow the law-philosophical
disquisitions on unjust laws notwithstanding-and are subject to discipline if they deliberately do otherwise. 279 When, however, applicable
law is ambiguous, justice, of necessity, requires judges to bring other
considerations to bear in interpreting the law to reach results that are
'just" to the parties in that case.
'Justice" is a polymorphous term that means different things to
different people, and now is not the time to develop and defend a
preferred theory ofjustice. As a purely descriptive matter, however, it
is enough to say that judges make decisions they regard as best, and
Part II tells us that when doing so, they are influenced by a range of
factors, including legal texts, their conceptions of good public policy,
the strategic consequences of their decisions, the audiences they are
seeking to reach, and self-interest. In this regard, judges are
"pragmatists" in the most banal sense of the term. 28 0 By its nature,
pragmatism takes an eclectic approach to the appropriate influences
on judicial decision making that is compatible with scholarly understanding of whatjudges do. As Thomas Grey has written, " [T] he pragmatist tendency is to promote trade rather than warfare between
normative and descriptive theorists, storytellers and model-builders,
interpreters and causal explainers."' 28 1 Writing in 1991, Richard Rorty
observed that "[p]ragmatism was reasonably shocking seventy years
278
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCr R. 2.2 (2007). For an extensive account of cases
involving judges being disciplined for interfering with the adversary process, see ALFINI ET
AL, supra note 272, at 2-23 to 2-27.
279
MODEL CODE OFJuD. CoNDucr R. 2.2; see, e.g., Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp.,
380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Just as the court of appeals must follow decisions of
the Supreme Court whether or not we agree with them.., so district judges must follow
the decision of this court whether or not they agree."); In re Feinberg, 833 N.E.2d 1204,
1209 (N.Y. 2005) ("Petitioner's consistent disregard for fundamental statutory requirements of office demonstrates an unacceptable incompetence in the law.").
280 Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE LJ. 409, 424 (1990) ("The
conclusion that legal pragmatism is irresistible might seem, at least for self-proclaimed
pragmatists, too good to be true. In fact, the conclusion is too true to be good. Pragmatism in the sense discussed above is irresistible because it is platitudinous.").
281 Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 791 (1989).
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ago, but in the ensuing decades it has gradually been absorbed into
American common sense." 28 2 Judge Posner and others are thus probably not exaggerating when they conclude that the term "pragmatist"-as embodied in a penchant for deciding difficult cases with
reference to public policy, the purposes underlying applicable rules,
and the social and institutional consequences of their rulings against
the backdrop of applicable law, "best describes the average American
judge at all levels of our judicial hierarchies and yields the greatest
insight into his behavior." 28 3 Judge Posner sometimes pits the "legalist" in opposition to his conception of pragmatic justice (although
'justice" is not the term Posner uses),284 but that seems largely unnecessary. The enlightened legalist embraces the ermine myth and its
rule-of-law ideal, but recognizes the role of discretion in divining applicable law, and the need to exercise that discretion with recourse to
the tools of the pragmatist. To that extent, pragmatism truly is
ubiquitous.
Pragmatism in this all-encompassing form is susceptible to the
criticism that it is "too true to be good," because it characterizes what
judges do in terms so broad as to lose descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive force. 28 5 That critique might be fatal were I to bring universal pragmatism to bear for the purpose analyzing how pragmatists
collectively would or should resolve particular legal problems. My
point here, however, is more limited: insofar as pragmatism writ large
describes the justice that most judges administer, judicial independence is an essential ingredient for the effective administration of
pragmatic justice in all its variations. Ascertaining how the law should
be applied in a given context to yield the best, fairest, or most reasonable or just results (pick your preferred adjective) necessarily requires a
familiarity with and an appreciation for the details of the case at hand.
A judge is uniquely situated to acquire the detailed information
needed to make pragmatic choices in the cases over which he or she
presides. Rendering that judge subservient to the wishes of interested
observers who lack access to (or concern for) context-specific facts
undermines the ability of the judge to arrive at just or fair outcomes.
Repackaging the justifications for an independent judiciary in
this way enables the legal establishment to defend the judiciary's autonomy without recourse to otherworldly claims thatjudges are apolitical or that law, formalistically defined, is all that matters in judicial
decision making. More fundamentally, it does so while preserving
282

Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatismand the Poetry ofJustice, in PRAGMATISM IN

LAW AND SOCIETY 89, 90 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
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and indeed strengthening the ermine myth that has protected and
promoted the judiciary's institutional legitimacy for centuries, by offering a threefold justification for the judiciary's continuing
independence.
B.

Reorienting the Legal Establishment's Reform Agenda

As the foregoing subpart argues, the legal establishment can and
should more openly acknowledge that there are spaces in the law that
independent judges fill through the exercise of discretion informed
by legal and extralegal considerations. These extralegal influences
are "political" in the broader sense of the term, insofar as they embrace the ideological, strategic, sociological, psychological, and economic factors that comprise the art of governing.28 6 The legal
establishment can nevertheless be more candid in conceding their
existence without fear of undermining judicial independence, if the
justifications for an independent judiciary are reoriented to focus on
the role independent judges play in upholding a more flexible rule of
law, in promoting due process, and in seeking just outcomes.
Conceding the impact of political influences has a Jekyll-andHyde quality: On the one hand, it is mild mannered to any thoughtful
student of the courts-including reflective lawyers and judges. On
the other hand, it would seem to do considerable violence to the idealized mythology of the judicial role that the legal establishment has
perpetuated in the public policy debate.
To reiterate, it is not only possible to reorient the legal establishment's position in the public policy debate to accommodate a more
"political" court while preserving the beneficial properties of the ermine myth, but necessary too if those who care about the courts desire
preserving the judiciary's independence and legitimacy in the long
term. Reorienting the legal establishment's perspective in this way,
however, comes at the cost of forcing it to rethink its reform agenda.
For over a century, the mantra of the legal establishment has been to
"depoliticize" or "take the politics out of' the courts. 287 If, however,
we concede the inevitability-and indeed the desirability-of courts
that are subject to certain kinds of "political" influences, then the time
has come for the legal establishment to abandon its crusade to exter286 Professor Stephen Burbank writes of legal and extralegal influences
complementary:
[K]nown and established (but not necessarily determinate) law and the
pursuit of a judge's preferences on matters of policy relevant in litigation
are complements in the sense that, like judicial independence and accountability, they need (or at least must rely on) each other.
Burbank, supra note 270, at 54.
287 See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
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minate "politics" from the judiciary and to seek instead to manage
judicial politics.
To a significant extent, the era of managing judicial politics is
already upon us, if ever there was a time when it was not. For the legal
establishment there is much to be gained and little to be lost by more
openly acknowledging this reality, which will enable it to structure its
policy agenda more coherently. The point is this: we wantjudges who
take the law seriously, and who are committed to due process and just
outcomes. On the one hand, as elaborated upon above, all three of
these objectives can be achieved by judges who are subject to extralegal influences and arguably cannot be achieved without such influences, given the need for judges to exercise discretion that extralegal
considerations inform. On the other hand, extralegal influences can
also thwart those objectives from within and without. From within, a
judge's ideological zeal, strategic scheming, naked self-interest, and
other influences can sometimes eclipse the judge's commitment to
law, due process, and just outcomes; from without, excessive external
interference with judicial decision making can intimidate or frustrate
the judge who would otherwise pursue desired objectives. The reform
agenda, then, must logically be directed at striking an appropriate balance between affording judges the independence necessary to perform their quasi-legal, quasi-political functions to achieve systemic
objectives without external interference, and subjecting judges to accountability-promoting measures that discourage internal interference with those same systemic objectives. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to fully develop a revised policy agenda that manages judicial politics in this way, but a few examples may illuminate how the
proposed approach could work.
Legal Education. Developing an approach to managing judicial
politics logically begins in law schools, where future lawyers, judges,
and (many) lawmakers are first exposed to the way judges think. Policy analysis-analyzing how judges decide difficult legal questions with
reference to competing policy concerns-is already a fixture of legal
education.2 88 No thoughtful law professor or student thinks that

judges can or do decide close questions of law with exclusive recourse
to legal texts, unaided by reference to legal policy. It is only a short
jump from there to identifying the factors that can influence individual judges to choose one policy over another.
Exposing law students to social science data detailing the legal
and extralegal influences on judicial decision making, as a smaller
part of the policy-analysis training that law students receive every day,
288
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would be a modest but important reform. From a purely practical
standpoint, it would equip students more systematically with information that good litigators gain haphazardly from experience. Recall the
Supreme Court forecasting project, discussed earlier. 28 9 The authors
there reported that experienced Supreme Court litigators bested academics and the computer model in predicting case outcomes, which
suggests that the litigators involved had become quite adept at identifying the legal and extralegal factors likely to influence the Justices'
decisions. 290 The sampling of litigators was too small for the researchers to draw firm conclusions as to their performance vis-d-vis other
291
forecasters in the study, but it is at least suggestive.
From a broader policy perspective, incorporating a modest social
science component into the law school curriculum provides the next
generation of the legal establishment with a way of looking at what
judges do that better equips it to manage judicial politics effectively.
And it begins with a more open recognition that the choices judges
make are subject to extralegal influences.
Judicial Selection. As documented in Part II, the mainstream legal
establishment opposes those who would "politicize" judicial selection, 292 and organizations such as the ABA and the American Judicature Society have long campaigned to "take the politics out" of the
selection process by, for example, ending state judicial elections and
limiting federal confirmation proceedings to an evaluation of nominee "qualifications. ' 293 These campaigns have, in a word, failed-a
majority of Americans continue to favor state judicial elections, and
federal confirmation proceedings remain an ideological battleground. 294 Quietly, the mainstream establishment has shifted tacks:
proposals to eliminate judicial elections altogether are taking a backseat to more modest proposals to reduce the putatively harmful effects
of elections (e.g., publicly funding judicial campaigns, replacing partisan with nonpartisan elections, and lengthening judicial terms to reduce election frequency),295 while calls to end Senate inquiries into a
See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
Ruger et al., supra note 11, at 1178 (detailing that the sample size consisted of only
twelve attorneys from a pool of eighty-three experts).
292
See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
293
See, e.g., Am.BAR ASS'N, supra note 19, at 70 (recommending that judicial appointments be based on merit and asserting that "the administration of justice should not turn
on the outcome of popularity contests").
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See, e.g., Richard Brust, No More Kabuki Confirmations: Better Ways to Vet Supreme Court
Nominees, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2009, at 39, 39 (describing the contentious nature of federal judicial confirmation hearings).
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See, e.g., Call toAction: Statement of the NationalSummit on ImprovingJudicialSelection,
34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1353, 1354 (2001) (briefly describing the threat thatjudicial elections
pose and stating that "[t]oo little attention has been given to incremental changes in the
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nominee's ideology are being replaced by a struggle to delineate the
appropriate scope of such inquiries. 2 96 In other words, the movement
within the legal establishment away from eliminating and toward managing judicial politics is well underway.
Even so, the establishment's orientation remains essentially unchanged: compromise measures may be a practical necessity, but in a
2 97
perfect world, the judiciary would be devoid of political influences.
More openly acknowledging the inherently quasi-legal, quasi-political
character ofjudging, however, may lead the legal establishment to entertain the possibility that managing rather than eliminating judicial
politics in the selection process is not just the best it can do but the
most it should do.
Thinking about state judicial selection reform in terms of striking
an optimal independence-accountability balance leads to three related conclusions. First, it means that interstate variations are desirable and inevitable: if, in the jurisdiction at issue, the greater
impediment to judges implementing law/fairness/common-sense
objectives is posed by external threats to judicial independence (from
the electorate or others), an independence-enhancing appointive system may be preferable; if, on the other hand, the primary concern is
that overly independent judges will supplant systemic objectives with
personal ones, an accountability-promoting elective system may be the
better means to preserve public confidence in the courts.2 98 Second,
and following from the first, it means that selection systems will be in a
perpetual state of flux, as circumstances affecting the independence-accountability calculations within given jurisdictions change
over time. Third, it suggests the possibility that states are right to "fine
tune" their selection systems. States interested in tempering the independence-threatening effects of elective systems should explore such
impartiality"); see also Am.BAR Ass'N, supra note 19, at 74 ("It is to those states [in which
judicial elections remain entrenched] that the Commission now directs its attention, with
recommendations aimed at ameliorating some of the deleterious effects of elections on the
enduring principles of a good judicial system"); James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today,
Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 293, 302 (2010) (arguing for incremental reforms
because "repeated calls for fundamental changes prove to be of scant pragmatic value").
296
See Brust, supra note 294 (touching upon some of the proposed suggestions aimed
at limiting the scope of ideological inquiry in federal judicial confirmation hearings).
297
See, e.g., Am. BAR Ass'N, supra note 19, at 74 (explaining that "The Commission
opposes the use of judicial elections as a means of initial selection," and " [o]ver the long
term ... believes that this view will win widespread acceptance. Over the short term, however, the Commission acknowledges that support for judicial elections remains entrenched
in many states" and that making a series of secondary proposals "aimed at ameliorating
some of the deleterious effects of elections" in states that retain them, is warranted).
298
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differences in that regard between the various court systems in the United States and between courts within the same system.").
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options as moving from partisan to nonpartisan races, publicly funding appellate campaigns, or lengthening judicial terms; conversely,
states seeking to enhance the accountability of appointive systems
should think about implementing judicial evaluation programs to accompany their retention elections, consider ways to improve the performance of judicial nominating commissions, and explore means
outside of the selection process to render judges answerable for their
conduct in office, for example, by strengthening disciplinary regimes
and disqualification processes (elaborated upon next).
With respect to the federal appointments process, it means recognizing the inevitability and desirability of Senate inquiries into the
range of legal and extralegal factors that can influence a nominee's
judicial decision making as a way to promote prospective accountability by satisfying the public's elected representatives that nominees will
take the law seriously, are committed to due process, and will pursue
pragmatic justice. It means acknowledging the need to draw lines that
protect against independence-threatening inquiries aimed at extracting promises or commitments from nominees to decide future
cases in specific ways. And it means abandoning the naive hope that
the appointments process can be purged of its acrimonious, partisan,
and strategic character; at the same time it means managing the politics of judicial appointments sufficiently to guard against attacks on
nominees so excessive and unrestrained that they threaten to
destabilize the process itself and undermine the judiciary's institu2 99
tional legitimacy.
Oversight of Judges and the Judiciary. As recounted in Part II, the
politics of judicial oversight has been polarized to such an extent as to
assume an almost cartoonish quality. Court critics, animated by the
view thatjudges are shameless policymakers run amok, have proposed
draconian court-curbing measures (such as impeachment, jurisdiction
stripping, and budget cuts) to hold judges accountable. 30 0 The legal
establishment, animated by the view that judges are incorruptible bastions of the rule of law, has opposed such measures as threats to judi30 1
cial independence.
When it comes to blunderbuss proposals such as these, which
30 2 it
have been cyclically proposed and rejected for generations,
should be possible, indeed easy, for the legal establishment to defend
the judiciary against them without resort to a one-dimensional conception of the judicial role. Without disputing that judges are subject
See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 172, at 124-25.
300 See supra Part H.A.
301
See supra Part II.B.
302 See generally GEYA, supra note 125 (discussing historical efforts by American legislatures to exercise control over the courts).
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to extralegal influences, ham-handed tactics aimed at rendering
judges subservient to the legislature do not seek to ensure thatjudges
are process-minded, justice-seeking guardians of law; rather, they seek
to ensure that judges do what legislators tell them to, to the detriment
of those very same values.
Fixation on these incendiary and almost inevitably doomed proposals to curb the courts, however, tends to perpetuate the misconception that keeping politics (or politicians) away from the courts is
and ought to be the legal establishment's lodestar. Obscured is the
routine give and take between the branches that typifies their normal
working relationship in a host of contexts, where managing judicial
politics has long been a familiar part of the process. 30

3

For example,

in 2006, Congress, dissatisfied with the judiciary's failure to discipline
judges in high-profile cases, proposed to create an office of inspector
general within the federal judiciary and initiated an impeachment inquiry into the conduct of a judge whose disciplinary proceeding was
pending.30 4 The Judicial Conference objected to the inspector-general proposal as a threat to its independence3 0 5 but revamped its disciplinary process, 30 6 and the bill was never adopted. 30 7 In the past
decade, bills were introduced in Congress to prohibit judges from participating in educational seminars sponsored by corporations with
business before the courts. 30 8 Federal judges and the Judicial Conference opposed such legislation as an affront to the separation of powGeyh, supra note 124, at 23 ("Over time, Congress and the courts have exploited a
303
variety of mechanisms for making their views known, communicating the depth of their
disaffection, achieving compromises, enabling face-saving acquiescence, and trumping
each other without provoking crises.").
304 Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5219, 109th
Cong., sec. 2(a), § 1021 (2006) (proposing the creation of an inspector general for the
judiciary to investigate judicial misconduct); Impeaching Manuel L. Real, a Judge of the United
States District Courtfor the CentralDistrict of California,for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hearing on H.RX Res. 916 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 2-4 (2006);JudicialTransparency and Ethics Enhancement
Act of 2006: Hearingon H.R.5219Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 1-4 (2006) [hereinafter Hearingon H.R. 5219]; see
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ers, their freedom of speech, and their independence-but ultimately
revised an ethical ruling to impose significant restrictions on judicial
attendance at expense-paid seminars. 3°9
Evaluating mainstream proposals for court governance and the
independence-accountability arguments they provoke, with more explicit reference to the three-fold objectives that independence and accountability serve, should help to structure and moderate the legal
establishment's response to such proposals. Judicial disqualification
reform is a useful example to illustrate the point and conclude this
Article because its regulation reflects the push and pull of the same
currents that have shaped the larger debate over what judges do.
"Impartiality" has been a defining feature of the judicial role for
centuries, and at common law, the presumption of impartiality was
irrebuttable: judges could not be disqualified for bias.3 10 In the twentieth century, however, scholars and policymakers began to challenge
this formalist proposition, and in the 1970s, federal and state laws
were revised to require disqualification whenever a judge was biased
or his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

'31 1

While these changes would seem to reflect a concession by the
legal establishment that judges are subject to extralegal influencesinfluences that need to be managed-many judges have been loath to
embrace the new world order embodied in the reforms. 3 12 Illustrative
of the continuing schism within the judicial community is the split
3 13
decision of the Supreme Court in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.
There, the Court ruled that a litigant's due process rights were vio309
Id. Compare U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 67: Attendance at Independent Educational Seminars (revised June 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/VolO2B-ChO2.pdf
(setting forth the factors a judge must consider when deciding whether to attend an expenses-paid seminar), with Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational
Programs? Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of JudicialEthics and Policy, 29
FORDHAM URB.L.J. 941, 954-60 (2002) (quoting extensively from the 1998 version of Advisory Opinion No. 67).
310 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361 ("[Jludges or justices cannot be challenged .. .for the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is
already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon
that presumption and idea.").
311
John P. Frank, Disqualificationof Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947) (questioning the
absence of a rule requiring disqualification for bias). In 1972, the ABA promulgated a
Model Code ofJudicial Conduct that required judges to disqualify themselves when their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned," and in 1974, Congress amended the federal
judicial disqualification statute to include that same language. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006);
MODEL CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972).
312 One multistate study conducted in the 1990s showed ambivalence among judges
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& JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRAC-

(1995).
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).

TICES AND ATTITUDES
313

2012] CAN THE RULE OF LAW SURVIVE JUDICIL POLITICS?

251

lated by a state supreme court justice who declined to disqualify himself from hearing an appeal after receiving over $3 million in support
(via independent expenditures) for his election campaign from a
CEO for one of the parties while the appeal was pending. 3 14 The fivemember majority proceeded from the assumption that judges are subject to extralegal influences and concluded that due process required
the imposition of an objective rule, without which, "there may be no
adequate protection against ajudge who simply misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case. '3 15 The resulting
rule that the majority invoked was "whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented."' 3 16 The four dissenters, in contrast, hewed to rule of
law rhetoric and ancient presumptions: "There is a 'presumption of
honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators,"' they declared.3 17 "All judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and
apply the law impartially, and we trust that they will live up to this
3 18
promise."
The majority in Caperton made clear that regulating disqualification via due process analysis was limited to extreme cases in which
egregious failures to disqualify were not prevented by the application
of state disqualification rules, which appeared to signal that Supreme
Court interventions could be obviated by rigorous application of state
disqualification standards. 319 In the immediate aftermath of Caperton,
however, ambivalence prevails: for example, while the Michigan Supreme Court adopted meaningful disqualification reform, the Wisconsin Supreme Court all but flouted the message of Caperton's
320
majority.
The divisions within the legal establishment overjudicial disqualification are put in boldest relief when it comes to the reform of disqualification procedure. The norm in the federal courts and most
states is that judges decide their own disqualification motions.3 2 1 Disqualification determinations are subject to review via appeal or mandamus, but such review is highly deferential, with the majority view
314
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being that ajudge's decision not to disqualify himself is reversible only
upon a showing of abuse of discretion.3 22 These rules sit well with
traditionalists, who adhere to the presumption of impartiality and its
premise that judges can bracket out extralegal influences and apply
the law; the rules sit badly with reformers who are skeptical of the
proposition that judges can step back from themselves and accurately
32 3
assess the extent of their own bias, real or perceived.
The approach I have advocated in this Article would call upon
the legal establishment to rethink its traditional view. If we acknowledge a range of extralegal influences on judicial decision making, and
propose to manage those influences to the end of maximizing the
rule of law; procedural fairness; and sound, pragmatic decision making, then several conclusions follow naturally.
First, the rule of law is initially better served if disqualification
rules are interpreted and applied by someone other than the targeted
judge who is predisposed to think himself qualified to sit, and subsequently better served if biased judges, who would not disqualify themselves, are thereby excluded. Second, due process is better served if
the judge qua fox is not called upon to guard his own henhouse.
Third, the perspective that comes from being apart from rather than a
part of the problem in the context of deciding disqualification motions improves the prospects for pragmatic, justice-seeking decision
making. Conversely, the consequences of the legal establishment adhering to the otherworldly premise that judges are impervious to the
very bias of which they stand accused when called upon to decide motions to disqualify themselves may transcend bad recusal policy. While
Caperton was pending, a survey found that 81% of respondents
thought that disqualification decisions should be made by a different
judge-an unsurprising result, given the pervasive view thatjudges are
subject to extralegal influences.3 24 Forjudges to dismiss the approach
that the public prefers by so overwhelming a margin as a "solution in
search of a problem 325 risks contributing to the gradual erosion of
public confidence in the courts that I have predicted.
CONCLUSION

The institutional legitimacy of the government depends on the
consent and support of the governed. The stability of such consent
and support is aided by a deep and abiding public faith in the system
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of government, which in turn is promoted by a shared belief in stories
that illustrate and aggrandize the principles upon which the government was founded. The nation's youth is inculcated with stories that
underscore the greatness of the "founding fathers"-their wisdom,
their virtue, and their heroism-and, by necessary implication, the
greatness of the government they established. Discussion of their
roles as white, male, slave-holding, propertied elites are correspondingly deemphasized, relegated to asides and more rarified forums.
For a myth to succeed in galvanizing the public over the long
term, however, there must be some "there" there. In that regard, the
achievements of the founding generation were in fact remarkable,
and the capacity of those achievements-even if embellished and selectively edited-to sustain a nation's faith for well over two centuries
is understandable. The same may be said for the ermine myth that
independent judges uphold and apply the law. The peril is that the
myth is gradually becoming antiquated to the point of losing its power
as a unifying principle in support of an independent judiciary, owing
to an emerging recognition that judges are influenced by more than
"law" traditionally understood. The burden of this Article has been to
show that by updating the ermine myth to embrace at its core a more
realistic vision of the judicial role, it should be possible to preserve the
myth as a unifying principle to sustain the judiciary's institutional legitimacy for future generations. The stories that the legal establishment tells of the judicial role will retain a mythical quality, insofar as
they embellish or exaggerate the truth by downplaying the extent to
which judges can and do abuse their independence to the detriment
of the rule of law; due process; and sound, pragmatic decision making. But the essence of the revised myth-that independent judges
seek to follow the law, adhere to due process, and bring their common sense to bear to the end of seeking just outcomes-retains the
sizable kernel of truth needed to preserve public support for the myth
and the continued independence of the courts. And if one thinks of
judicial accountability in terms of managing extrajudicial influences
on judicial decision making to reduce the abuses of judicial independence, it will enable that kernel of truth to grow.
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